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Abstract  
Community based natural resource management (CBNRM) is a fairly new concept to be 
implemented in natural resource management in Cambodia. The implementation process is still 
going on and the political, social and economic situation in the country plays a major role in this 
process. The history of Cambodia tells about a country affected by changing regimes, genocide, 
corruption and lack of social capital and this have an effect on the implementation of CBNRM. 
This project is discussing the implementation of community based natural resource management 
in Cambodia with emphasis on participation by the local population since these are the target 
group in CBNRM.  
 
The organisational structure of Cambodian society is a constraint when implementing CBNRM 
since there is no tradition for people’s organisation within communities and the patron-client 
relationship brings further implications when power structures are reproduced in the decision-
making processes and hindering poor people to have a say in the decision-making. Power 
relations play a big role in decision-making concerning natural resource management in 
Cambodia and participation at all levels of society is thus difficult to obtain. Government 
authorities are reluctant to transfer power to local people, and national and international agencies 
implementing CBNRM are also hesitant to include the local population in the decision-making 
process. Hence in many instances of the decision-making and implementation of CBNRM it is 
business as usual, where authorities and powerful people make decisions and local people are 
only participating to a minor extent.  
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
 
This project will discuss community based natural resource management (CBNRM) in Cambodia, 
with case examples from the development and implementation of community forestry and 
community fisheries. The emphasis will be on participation in the management of the natural 
resources; and here participation is understood as a bottom-up approach to development 
activities. Participation, as a bottom-up approach, has been on the agenda in development work 
since the 1970s (Cornwall 2002) and is still, more than ever, used, at least as a concept, in 
development work. While NGOs and international and national development agencies and 
organisations are embracing participatory approaches, the meaning of the concept ‘participation’ 
is unambiguous. According to Peters (1996:22), participation in a development context “ideally 
connotes the ability of people to share, influence, or control design, decision-making, and 
authority in development projects and programs which affect their lives and resources”.  
 
 
Introduction 
In order to understand the context of CBNRM in Cambodia and the circumstances that make 
Cambodia an interesting country to examine in relation to implementation of CBNRM, an 
introduction to the 
country and its history 
will be outlined in the 
following.  
 
Cambodia is located in 
Southeast Asia by the 
Gulf of Thailand, 
surrounded by 
Thailand, Laos and 
Vietnam. The country 
covers 181,035 square 
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kilometres with dominant features of water, fisheries and forests. Tonle Sap Great Lake is the 
largest freshwater lake in Southeast Asia and one of the most productive inland fisheries in the 
world. The level and surface area of the lake varies from 2.500 to 10.400 km2 in size due to 
flooding during the rainy season. The lake serves as an important habitat to a high biodiversity of 
fish, reptile, bird, mammal and plant species.  
 
Forest of the country covers approximately 10.447 million ha in 2005 and has declined from 
12.946 in 1990 (FAO 2005). Additionally, anecdotal evidence suggests that the quality of the 
remaining forest has been severely degraded (van Acker 2003b:18). These forests include 
flooded, mangrove, bamboo, coniferous, dry deciduous and moist deciduous, moist evergreen, 
moist mountain and dwarf evergreen forests. The forests provide benefit to people in the form of 
timber and non-timber products such as fuel wood, medicinal plants, etc. (Sithirith 2004 & 
Carson et al. 2005).  
 
Cambodia has a population of 13.091 million and according to World Bank data from 1997 it has 
a poverty incidence at 36% (UNDP 2004:1ff) of which 90% live in the rural areas (van Acker 
2003b:9). In 2003 the literacy rate in Cambodia was 73.6% of the adult population above the age 
of 15 compared to 62% in 1990 (UNDP 2005:260). However, in the rural upland areas the 
literacy rate is down to 16% and for some indigenous people down to 10% (Braeutigam 2003:5). 
Furthermore, approximately 55% of the total population was under the age of 20 in 1999 (ibid:5). 
 
Cambodia is a rural country; more than 10 million Cambodians are living in the rural areas and 
over 8.5 million of these people are dependent on natural resources to support their livelihoods, 
mainly for subsistence (McKenney & Tola 2002:1). Rice farming is the dominant activity in the 
rural areas but forest and fishery also play a big role in the subsistence of the rural population; for 
instance does 90% of the population in Cambodia rely on firewood for cooking purposes. 
Furthermore forest and fishery are means for diversifying the subsistence and income-generating 
activities for the rural households for instance in cases of agricultural failure like droughts.  
 
The historical past of Cambodia makes the political and social situation in the country special and 
this is affecting Cambodia’s civil society and natural resources. The political structure heavily 
influences on natural resources as they determine how the resources should be managed and used. 
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Natural resources have been employed as a tool for political actors to gain power through selling 
them or granting rights to others who can benefit and support the political actors.  
 
There are historical factors that place Cambodia in a special situation when it comes to 
implementation of new strategies in for instance natural resource management. A review of the 
political history of Cambodia reveals that the country has experienced many different political 
regimes, some of which lasted a few years while others lasted almost a century. Each shift of 
regime resulted in revolutions.  
 
From 1863-1953 Cambodia was a French colony where natural resources were taxed and access 
rights privatised in order to generate revenue. The system of privatising is still being 
implemented today; for instance in the fishing lot and forest concession which will be discussed 
in chapter five. In 1953 Cambodia’s independence was proclaimed and in the period between 
1953 and 1970 Sihanouk ruled. Sihanouk’s rule was accused for extensive corruption in 
government ranks. A rebellion broke out in 1967 and in 1970 General Lon Nol deposed Sihanouk 
as chief of the state. However, Lon Nol became very soon unpopular because of widespread 
corruption and meanwhile the revolutionary movement, Khmer Rouge gained increased support 
and their forces took control over much of the northern and eastern Cambodia. In 1975 Khmer 
Rouge took rule over the whole country and implemented one of the most brutal regimes, where 
more than one million people died from famine, disease and executions in its 3 years and 8 
months of rule. Following the Khmer Rouge regime, the country was pushed into a civil war 
between the former Khmer Rouge and the Vietnamese supported government, which lasted until 
the beginning of the 1990s. It was not until 1993, when the UN sponsored an election that 
stability in the country slowly emerged. However, peace in the countryside has only been 
achieved since 1998 (Braeutigam 2003:5). 
 
Hence, Cambodia has a turbulent history of un-trustable and corrupt regimes, which has left the 
population in a situation where activities from the government, that are changing status quo, are 
being looked upon with suspicion. Cambodian social capital has been damaged due to the 
political instability. Trust is one of the main components of social capital; thus when social 
capital is damaged, trust is also damaged. Hence after decades of conflict, the big task is to 
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rebuild the trust and confidence among community members as well as between communities and 
the government.  
 
Furthermore, when talking about the politics in Cambodia, corruption is another big issue. 
Corruption is regarded as a prevalent issue within the country especially in political culture where 
corruption can occur at all levels of administration, from the top to the bottom level and in every 
sector; even in the anti-corruption sector. Corruption is also an issue when power is transferred 
from one level to another. Power is often in the hands of a small elite group and in order to 
maintain their position and power, the elite groups have used their power to exploit for instance 
the natural resources illegally and unsustainably.  
 
Hence the political and social situation in Cambodia makes the country an interesting country to 
examine in terms of implementation of community based natural resource management. 
Cambodia’s natural resources have declined due to illegal and unsustainable harvests of timber 
and fish by industries, the military, local authorities and a growing population (McKenney & 
Tola 2002:1). Most of the population in Cambodia is dependent on natural resources that provide 
a foundation for food security, income and employment. In 2000 approximately 30% of GDP in 
Cambodia stemmed from agriculture, forest and fisheries and these sectors employed around 77 
percent of the population, with the agricultural sector employing 74% of the population (ibid:15).  
 
The statutory rights to most of the natural resources in Cambodia, like forests and fish, are owned 
by the state and managed by the different government departments except privatised arable land 
(van Acker 2003b:7). The local communities have de facto or common rights to the resources but 
the state has been hesitant to transfer access rights to the local communities. Furthermore, the fact 
that different departments on behalf of the state are managing the natural resources has made it 
difficult to plan and implement integrated strategies for management of the natural resources 
(ibid). The destruction of natural resources has left local people without access to natural 
resources and according to van Acker (2003b:5) with fishing, hunting and gathering as the only 
options for subsistence. The value of the resources makes the management of natural resources a 
politically contested area (ibid:7). 
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The management of Cambodia’s natural resources is a challenge in the coming decades 
especially because of the pressure on land, fisheries and forests and the importance of the 
resources to the rural population. A “central component of future poverty reduction efforts must 
be effective natural resource management” (McKenney & Tola 2002:1). According to van Acker 
(2003b:5) “safeguarding and broadening access to common property resources (forestry and 
fisheries), land distribution (…) and land management (…) offer the best opportunities for direct 
poverty reduction related to NRM in Cambodia”. Cambodia has commenced a decentralisation 
process and as an element in this process community based natural resource management is being 
implemented. In the light of the necessity to implement effective management of the natural 
resources in Cambodia and the political and social situation in Cambodia, this project will look at 
community based natural resource management in Cambodia. The main focus of community 
based natural resource management is to search for compromises between the local needs, 
outsider interests and policies on a national level rather than focussing on the enforcement of 
practices through legal directives (van Acker 2003b:10). Furthermore, CBNRM reveals a shift in 
criteria from technical parameters to people’s perspectives and government policies, and the 
objective is to strengthen the capacities of local stakeholders (ibid:10ff).  
 
 
Problem statement and research question 
One of the many reasons for engaging the local population in development work is in order to 
achieve sustainable development. In order to achieve sustainable development, it is necessary that 
the concept of sustainable development is negotiated locally; local people have to define how 
they understand the concept of sustainable development. Participating in the definition of goals or 
objectives of a development process is part of a participatory strategy, where governments or 
authorities are co-players. It is, however, vital to remember that participation in its essence is a 
political process, which involves conflict and contestation among different stakeholders; that is 
within a community, or between locals and government authorities etc. This is also why a 
political analysis can reveal how participation takes place or does not and why it is so.  
 
Historically many states have expanded their control over territories to also include natural 
resources upon which local people depend for their livelihoods. As the state has institutionalised, 
local people have become less involved in the natural resource management and hence in the 
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decision-making concerning the natural resources (Pimbert 2004:1ff). Participatory strategies 
have been tried out at local level and recently also at a larger scale, but people’s participation is 
far from institutionalised in decision-making. The decentralisation process in Cambodia can be a 
means towards institutionalising participation, which can make CBNRM more effective. 
However, with participation not being institutionalised in decision-making and a society in 
Cambodia with corruption and widespread distrust in especially government authorities this 
project will examine how participation is being implemented in natural resource management and 
discuss the differences between theory and practice. This report is hence focusing on community 
based natural resource management with examples of community forestry and community fishery 
from Cambodia.   
The research question of this project looks as follows: 
 
With particular reference to Cambodian forest and inland fisheries management, how is 
community based natural resource management (CBNRM) implemented in Cambodia, what 
are the opportunities and constraints for implementing CBNRM and what are the 
alternatives?  
 
 
Explanation of research question 
Community participation as a concept is frequently used in development activities in natural 
resources management, since the resources that community members use are often to be shared 
between members of the community. The role of community in resource use and conservation 
has gained attention in resource management strategies after many years of failed top-down 
strategies. Many of the methods deployed to conserve natural resources in the developing 
countries originated in the West where money and personnel were plentiful in order to reach the 
conservation objectives. However, communities can be a successful alternative to state or private 
management of resources. There are many arguments why local communities are the good 
conservators of the resources; these arguments are for instance stating that if communities are not 
involved in the management, they will use these destructively or that locals have an interest in 
managing the resources. However, some images of communities are deducing the local 
community to a homogenous entity and ignore the different interests and processes within these 
communities (Agrawal & Gibson 1999:633). Community is a heterogeneous group of people, and 
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therefore policies aiming towards community participation in natural resource management must 
reflect this diversity of opinions, interests, behaviours and power. This makes it even more 
interesting to understand the conditions for participation in the policy process, because 
participation is not only supposed to take place at a national level, but also at a local level. 
 
This report is examining how participation is being implemented in community based natural 
resource management in Cambodia and the constraints and opportunities for this. Participation is 
a political process and in a development context according to Oakley (1995:4) this is where 
“previously excluded classes or groups seek to become involved, have a voice in and generally 
gain access to the benefits of economic and social development”. Participation is hence concerned 
with addressing imbalances in the development process and creating opportunities for people to 
participate actively in this process in order to gain benefits. If people should be able to participate 
there is a need for bureaucratic decentralisation, local institutional strengthening and 
improvement of skills and capacities of the rural poor (ibid:8).  
 
Participation can take place at different levels in society and the type of participation can vary 
from place to place, and these elements are what will be discussed throughout this project. Due to 
the political and social situation in Cambodia, there are constraints that needs to be overcome in 
order to obtain participation from the population and the research question is hence providing 
basis for an analysis of both constraints and opportunities in community based natural resource 
management in Cambodia, with emphasis on participation and power in decision-making.  
 
 
Project design and sub-questions 
In order to understand the essence of community based natural resource management (CBNRM), 
this project will look into participation in policy making. Participation evolves from a principle of 
democratisation, where people are able to participate in the democratic decision-making 
processes. However, this can be rather difficult to obtain; even in a developed, democratic 
country like Denmark the decision-making process can seem hard to take part in. In order to 
systematise the structure of the project, sub-questions have been made and in the following these 
will be outlined along with an overview of each of the chapters in the project. 
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Chapter two will outline the methodology used in the project in relation to theory and empiric 
evidence, and the strengths and weaknesses of the method.   
 
Chapter three will be the theoretical part of the project where the theoretical approach to the 
research question will be outlined. Both power and participation in relation to decision-making 
processes will be presented as well as important aspects in relation to implementation. The 
chapter will discuss the following question: 
How is participation put into action in decision-making and how can power be used in decision-
making? 
 
Chapter four will contain a discussion about natural resources. Natural resources are diverse in 
space and time and have various characteristics. Hence the management of natural resources is a 
complex matter. The chapter will discuss the following question: 
What are the central issues that need to be considered in natural resource management?  
 
Chapter five will introduce the case examples on community forestry and community fishery in 
Cambodia. The emphasis will be on how the community based approach has been introduced in 
the different sectors and on the involved stakeholders. The following question will be discussed 
in the chapter:  
What is the institutional structure of forestry and fishery in Cambodia and how are stakeholders 
involved in the two sectors?  
 
Chapter six will contain a discussion about the findings from the case examples that will lead to 
a conclusion on the research question of the project. The findings will be discussed in relation to 
the theory as well as in relation to the social, political and economic situation in the country. The 
following questions will be answered in the discussion: 
At which stages in the policy process is the local population involved in the case examples? 
What are the constraints and opportunities for implementing community participation in the 
cases? 
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Chapter seven will sum up on the aspects concerning the sub-questions and conclude on the 
research question. Furthermore, alternative opportunities for people’s participation in natural 
resource management in Cambodia will be reflected upon. 
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Chapter 2: Methodology  
 
The project is based on a theoretical and empirical part which will be used in order to understand 
the implementation of community based natural resource management in Cambodia and the 
opportunities and constraints in relation to this. This chapter will discuss the use of theory and 
empirical data in the project. 
 
 
The empirical foundation 
The project will look at two cases from Cambodia where CBNRM has been applied. The overall 
aim of community based natural resource management is to involve the local population in the 
management of the resources and in this project the two cases from Cambodia will be used to 
discuss to what extent and how participation from the local population has been taking place. 
Hence, power in decision-making and the participation from the local communities that uncovers 
from the cases will be the focus of the discussion.  
 
The two cases from Cambodia are discussing community fishery and community forestry 
initiatives respectively in order to examine how CBNRM is implemented in Cambodia. Forest and 
fisheries are two of the biggest renewable natural resources in Cambodia and the two resources 
are facing serious damage due to for example use of destructive fishing gear and harmful 
commercial logging practices. Furthermore the two resources demand different management 
strategies due to their size and mobility (see more on this in chapter four). Hence the two cases 
have been chosen in order to examine CBNRM in different management strategies. However, the 
focus of the project is community based natural resource management in Cambodia; and 
community fisheries and community forestry are only examples of this.    
 
The empirical data in this project is based upon a literature review; field work has not been 
conducted. The literature chosen for this study is mainly academic articles, and documents from 
development and government agencies, which are describing and analysing CBNRM in 
Cambodia, mainly in regard to forestry and fishery. In the search for literature, mostly academic 
journals, research institutes and development agencies have been used in order to obtain relevant 
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articles and documents. The selection of the literature has been done out of direct relevance to the 
issues concerning CBNRM in Cambodia and the case examples; that is forestry, fisheries, 
participation, community participation and natural resource management. Some of the articles are 
reviewing community forestry and community fishery in Cambodia generally whereas others are 
analysing case studies from specific initiatives in Cambodia. The articles describing and 
analysing the issues of CBNRM in general terms are chosen in order to understand some of the 
more general conditions surrounding CBNRM in Cambodia. Articles based on case studies and 
discussing specific forestry or fishery initiatives are used to understand some of the problems that 
are related to implementation of CBNRM initiatives.   
 
The empirical data used in this project is primarily done with other purposes in mind than the 
purpose of this project. Hence the view and perception of, for instance, the successes of CBNRM 
in Cambodia can vary according to the methods applied by the researchers and the goals of their 
studies. For instance, consultant work and reports are influenced by the terms of reference that 
the consultant work with, and values and interests of an international organisation affects the 
reports from the organisation. Furthermore, people are looking at the world through different 
theories and are influenced by their (academic) background, and hence understanding actions and 
concluding upon these in different ways. This is also the case for the authors of the articles used 
in this project and therefore in order to overcome biased conclusions from the empirical data, the 
data will be discussed as it is being used throughout the project.  
 
The literature used in this project can be split into different categories. The literature from 
development and government agencies (especially Braeutigam 2003; Beang & Sethaphal 2004; 
Evans 2002; Im 2000; Fichtenau et al. 2002; van Acker 2003b) are mainly reports made by 
consultants and international organisations, and articles made by employees in the Royal 
Government of Cambodia. The literature is mainly analysing the technical matters in the 
implementation of CBNRM and is critical towards the actual technical implementation. The 
literature is mainly emphasising technical constraints towards implementation such as problems 
with traditional power structures or lack of capacity and financial resources.  
 
The literature from independent academics and research institutes (especially Sithirith 2004; 
McKenny & Tola 2002; Lindayati 2000; Levinson 2002; de Lopez 2004; Kurien 2006) are more 
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critical towards the implementation of community based natural resource management in 
Cambodia in terms of participation. One of the biggest issues is the lack of participation from the 
local communities and their opportunities for managing and gaining access to the resources. 
However, the reasons behind the problems, such as the political factors constraining participation 
are not discussed extensively. 
 
One of the issues that, in my opinion, lack in the literature is a discussion on participation in the 
decision-making processes. Many of the issues concerning CBNRM that will be discussed in this 
project have, in my opinion, not been discussed thoroughly in the literature. The literature has in 
many cases mentioned lack of participation as a constraint for succeeding in implementing 
CBNRM but an actual discussion of the constraints and opportunities for participation and the 
reasons behind these are lacking. This is what will be discussed in this project. Since this project 
is not based on fieldwork, where participants would be able to explain their participation in the 
different stages of the decision-making process, the discussion will be in more general terms. 
This means that issues like transfer of power or access to information will be discussed with 
examples from case studies made by others in specific locations, and will hence not necessarily 
concern all CBNRM initiatives. However, a discussion of these issues is necessary since they are 
constraints or opportunities for succeeding in the implementation of CBNRM, even though it is 
only happening in one location. Furthermore, some of the reasons behind for instance the 
problems of implementing CBNRM are rooted in the way the Cambodian society is structured. 
This means that the problems could appear in all cases where CBNRM is being implemented in 
Cambodia.   
 
Common for all literature used in this project is that the actual initiatives of community based 
natural resource management is not questioned. There seems to be consensus in the sense that the 
way to obtain the most sustainable natural resource management is through community 
management. The different perceptions are in the way it is being implemented or in the speed it is 
being implemented. Community management seems to work in some locations and not in others; 
there is no final answer to what makes the difference between the management. However, it is 
important to bear in mind that natural resources are specific in time and space and the 
implementation of community based natural resource management should therefore adapt to the 
context. This project will examine how community based natural resource management is being 
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implemented in Cambodia and especially examine the constraints and opportunities, both 
technical and human, to participation in natural resource management. The participatory strategy 
does not have certain guidelines and can be implemented differently depending on the context. 
However, CBNRM is not necessarily the best alternative to natural resource management in 
Cambodia and this will be discussed in the project.  
 
 
Theoretical foundation 
The theory of this project is used to discuss what kind of participation and power can be present 
in decision-making and furthermore, where the power is exercised. It is in the decision-making 
process that the agenda for the community based natural resource management is being set; this is 
where the content of community based natural resource management is defined. This means that 
participants in the decision-making process are deciding what community based natural resource 
management should contain in the specific context. It is hence necessary to understand what 
participation actually means in decision-making processes and how power relations are affecting 
the decision-making processes.  
 
The theoretical foundation for the discussion about participation in decision-making processes 
will be based on James Hyland’s (1995) discussion about the concept of democracy. Hyland is, in 
his book, Democratic Theory, discussing how to construct a definition of democracy that will 
treat problems that have emerged as concerns in the democratic tradition. Even though the book 
is discussing democracy and not participation, basic principles of participation in decision-
making processes can be derived from the democracy discussion. In the book it is discussed what 
the term democracy includes and thereby also the principles of participation in a democratic 
society. Hyland (1995:81) has defined democracy as “a system of decision-making in which all 
those who are subject to the decisions made have equally effective power to determine the 
political outcomes of the decision-making”. The definition of democracy describes an ideal world 
where people, individually have equal power. This way of perceiving the world is idealistic, since 
there are power differences between people in terms of knowledge, money, social status etc. 
Consequently, it is necessary to add the aspect of people’s rights and ability to organise in groups 
to the discussion about democracy. It is easier for a group of people to have a say in a decision-
making process, especially if they individually do not possess much power. However, in the 
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group, there might also be some persons who possess more power than the others and thereby can 
control the decisions in the group. Yet, in regard to the individual equality of power, the way 
some people are to get opportunities to have their individual needs or wishes heard in the 
decision-making process is though interest groups.    
 
Political equality is emphasised by Hyland and this will be one of the terms that will be 
considered in this project since this is one of the basic principles for participation in decision-
making processes. Thus participation will be discussed with reference to democratic theory and 
with focus on Hyland’s discussion about basic principles of participation and types and levels of 
participation in decision-making.    
 
Another very important aspect of decision-making processes is power, since decisions are 
products of power relations between actors with interests in the decisions. This means that 
decisions, be it on a national level or in a household, is done with contestation between different 
interests, and during the contestation power is being exercised. A decision-making process 
involves power relations at different levels in the process and these are shaping the outcome of 
the decision-making process. There is however different ways of exercising power and this will 
also be discussed. Christensen and Jensen (2001) have developed a framework of the decision-
making process, which emphasises the different ways power can be exercised. The definition of 
power is split into four dimensions; direct, indirect, latent and institutionalised power.  
 
The first three dimensions of power are operating with actor-oriented effects whereas the fourth 
dimension is working with institutional effects. The three first dimensions are assuming that 
people are acting rational and with a goal in mind. In general, organisations are created in a way 
so rational decisions can be made – through specialisation and hierarchy. Units or departments 
are considered more effective and hence more cost effective when they are specialising in certain 
areas. In a hierarchy, the higher you are in this kind of division of labour, the more authority you 
get. Furthermore, the hierarchy is coordinating the work so an optimal solution to problems is 
found. This means that certain tasks belong to certain units or departments. The rational model 
often pictures a world in harmony and free of conflicts, but this is often a picture of the formal 
organisation (Christensen & Jensen 2001:103). In this project the rational model is used since it 
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in a simple way shows how power can be exercised in decision-making and where power 
relations play a role.        
 
In the theory section, the approach to the decision-making process will be combined with the 
different types of participation described by Hyland in order to understand how it is possible to 
participate in the decision-making process. Hyland splits the decision-making process into four 
main areas; agenda-setting, comparative assessment, decision-making and implementation, and 
these will be the framework for the discussion of participation in the decision-making process. In 
these four areas power relations shape the discussions and decisions. Hence they will be used to 
understand the kind of power that can be used in the different stages of the decision-making 
process and the different types of participation that can be involved in this process.  
 
An important aspect in relation to the decision-making process is the implementation of the 
decision or policy and the outcome of the implementation. In order for a policy to be effective it 
has to be adopted by the target group and the process of implementation with its relevant actors is 
hence necessary to understand. Both Hyland and Christensen & Jensen are discussing the 
implementation in their approaches to the decision-making process, but they are not discussing 
the variables affecting the implementation process. Therefore, the approach of Winter (1990), to 
the implementation process will be used in order to discuss key factors affecting the outcome of 
the implementation process. Winter is using four main socio-political processes to explain the key 
factors that determine the outcome of implementation; (i) the character of the policy formation 
process; (ii) the organisational and inter-organisational implementation behaviour; (iii) the street-
level bureaucratic behaviour; and (iv) the target group response and changes in society. Each of 
these four processes will be discussed, however with more emphasis on the last three processes 
since the key factors of the policy formation process affecting the implementation, is also being 
discussed in the approaches by Hyland and Christensen & Jensen. Yet, the policy formation 
process is very important since it can affect the other three socio-political processes. 
  
The choices and conclusion 
A project is full of decisions, which obviously have an effect on the project. I have chosen certain 
theories in the project and this means that other theories are not being used. The choice of theory 
will have an effect on the conclusion of the project since my choice of theory is affected by the 
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perception I have of the world. From my point of view democracy and participation are basic 
rights, and they are ideals that “the world” should try to obtain. This perception is affecting the 
project since what I am looking for throughout the project are signs of democratic decision-
making and participation in the cases. However, it is necessary to bear this perception in mind 
and questioning it, since there are things that affect the ability to obtain democracy and 
participation. Democracy and participation are concepts “invented” in the western part of the 
world and applied to third world countries where this kind of organisation of society might not be 
common; their perceptions of the world are different. This means that the political, social, 
cultural and economic conditions are affecting how people perceive the world and this is 
necessary to bear in mind in the discussion of the implementation of CBNRM in Cambodia.  
 
The theories used in this project are discussing different concepts but they discuss these in 
relation to decision-making processes. Hyland is discussing the decision-making process in terms 
of democratisation and ideal participation whereas Christensen & Jensen are discussing power 
structures in the decision-making process, which are not necessarily democratic. However, the 
theories, including Winter’s approach to implementation are showing weak sides of the decision-
making process that are undemocratic.  
 
Nonetheless, the theories are trying to reveal how the ideal decision-making process would be in 
a democratic society. Christensen & Jensen are showing where power is being exercised in the 
decision-making process in order to reveal where it is necessary to look for power structures that 
affect the decision-making process. Hence, in order to obtain a more democratic decision-making 
process the power structures should be visible to all; otherwise decisions will be made on wrong 
grounds. The same is more or less the fact with Hyland; he is explaining how the ideal 
democratic decision-making should look like. Different issues in the decision-making process are 
important factors in the process of obtaining democratic decision-making where people are 
participating. If decisions are to be democratic certain conditions in the decision-making process 
should be fulfilled.  
 
The theoretical approaches by Hyland and Christensen & Jensen are hence describing ideal 
democratic decision-making and the conclusion of this project will therefore be affected in this 
direction; to what extent does democratic decision-making exist in Cambodia or what is lacking 
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in the CBNRM in Cambodia in order to obtain democratic decision-making. But what if 
Cambodia is not ready for democratic decision-making with all its attributes or what if CBNRM is 
not the best solution to management of natural resources in Cambodia? The answers to these 
questions will not be considered if the empirical data is discussed in relation to the theory only. 
Hence in chapter six (the discussion), the empirical data will be discussed in relation to the 
theory, but the theory will also be discussed in relation to the actual political, social and economic 
situation in Cambodia. This is done in order to understand how participation in decision-making 
processes and management of natural resources are affected by the political, social and economic 
condition in the country. 
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Chapter 3: Participation and power 
 
The aim of this chapter is to discuss some central concepts in relation to community based natural 
resource management (CBNRM). CBNRM is centred around a principle of participation of the 
population dependent on the natural resources in question. This chapter will discuss the concept 
of participation, especially in relation to decision-making processes and furthermore discuss 
power relations in the decision-making processes. The aim is to understand the degrees and types 
of participation that are present in a democratic decision-making process and thereafter discuss 
how power relations are playing a role in decision-making processes.  
 
The first part of this chapter is discussing participation in decision-making processes and the 
point of departure is Hyland’s (1995) discussion about democracy. The second part will discuss 
power relations in decision-making processes by using a four-dimensional understanding of 
power in decision-making by Christensen & Jensen (2001). Finally the two approaches will be 
discussed together, and Winter’s (1990) approach to variables affecting implementation outcomes 
will be used in the section discussing implementation. The discussions will be used in the final 
chapters (chapter five and six) to study how people have participated in the natural resource 
management in Cambodia. 
 
 
Participation in decision-making  
Participation is based on a democracy approach, where people themselves make decisions 
relevant to their lives. Hence some of the basic understandings of participation can be found in a 
discussion about the concept of democracy. According to Hyland (1995:41) “democracy 
concerns the exercise of power and decision-making by a group”. Hyland is discussing whether it 
is possible for a group to rule in a collective sense, since ruling involves making decisions, and 
consensus in a group is often very difficult. A decision is “the choice to implement one of the 
several available alternative courses of action” (Hyland 1995:56) and hence determining how a 
specific issue should be interpreted when being implemented.  
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One of the main issues in a democracy approach is effective political equality; the more political 
equality in a decision-making process, the more democratic the process is. Political equality is the 
equal access to the different procedures in the decision-making processes and is connected to 
equality of power in determining the outcome of a decision-making process. According to Hyland 
(1995:56) “political equality will consist in equal effectiveness in determining political outcomes, 
and that, for a system of rule to be democratic this equal effectivity will have to be mediated by 
decision-making rules guaranteeing procedural equality”.   
 
Hyland identifies four moments or stages in decision-making that can help in the understanding 
of how “decision-making must be structured if political equality is going to be approximated in a 
group making decisions collectively” (Hyland 1995:56-7). These four moments are i) agenda-
setting and identification of alternatives; ii) comparative assessment; iii) decision between 
alternatives and iv) implementation.  
 
The first moment is concerned with identifying “the necessity of choosing and the set of available 
options for choice” (Hyland 1995:57); hence this is the process of setting the agenda. A person or 
a group has a lot of power if they possess the power to determine what everybody else has to 
choose between. The reason for this is that by setting the agenda and identifying the alternatives 
to be discussed, it also pre-determines the possible final outcomes of the decision, by leaving 
some alternatives out. This means that those without power in the process of agenda-setting have 
been denied the power to decide anything significant, even though they might have equal voting 
opportunities in the later stages of the decision-making process. Hence equal agenda-setting 
rights are required if power should be distributed equally. Furthermore free and equal access to 
relevant information in relation to the decision is also necessary in order to avoid manipulation. If 
some groups exclusively have access to relevant information concerning the decision of 
alternatives, they are in the power of determining once again the outcomes of the final decision 
(Hyland 1995:58ff).   
  
In the second moment comparative assessment is taking place. This is where alternatives are 
being discussed and pros and cons of the alternatives are considered. In this stage of the decision-
making process free and equal access to information is also necessary in order for participants to 
make decisions based on the same grounds. Again, lack of access to all relevant information will 
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destroy the political equality and can exclude some of the alternatives in the decision-making. 
There are different perceptions of what is relevant and important information and what is not, and 
therefore multiple information channels are required to assure that all points of views are able to 
be considered in the assessment of alternatives (Hyland 1995:59). Furthermore, another issue in 
the comparative assessment is the openness of discussion or debate. Firstly, relevant information 
on complex issues is often available in fragments and hence, by publishing debates about the 
issues, access to relevant information becomes more equal. Secondly, free access to voice a 
person’s opinion is a necessity in order for participants to be equally effective. This means that 
freedom of speech is an important instrument in decision-making processes since it, again, allows 
equal access to determine the final outcomes (Hyland 1995:64).       
 
The third moment is where it is decided which alternative to choose to implement. In situations of 
collective decision-making this is a complex moment, since consensus is not always easy to 
obtain. Even though equal effectiveness is crucial in the first two moments of decision-making in 
order to prevent some groups in pre-determining the final outcome, equal effectiveness is also 
important in the third moment. The equal effectiveness in this moment is expressed in the voting 
procedures, with one person, one vote. The equal effectiveness is based on the fact that the same 
importance is given to each person’s vote when determining the decision to be implemented 
(Hyland 1995:65). The subsequent procedures of vote aggregation in the decision-making, such 
as questions like, if unanimity is required if the decision should be implemented or if the majority 
rules, is discussed by Hyland (1995:65ff), but will not be discussed in this project, since emphasis 
is on the concept of participation and not on procedures of democracy. 
 
The final moment is the implementation of the decision; “when the choice arrived at is translated 
into action” (Hyland 1995:57). In this moment the outcome must be determined by the decision 
arrived at in the previous moment, otherwise there will be no effective political equality. The 
effective equality in the implementation means that the decision-makers should have autonomy to 
control their own affairs (Hyland 1995:66). This means that, structures in society, like for 
instance economic powers, that are undermining and making it impossible for the decision-
makers to implement the decision, should not exist. According to Hyland “freedom and self-
determination (…) will involve necessarily not only the effective right to ‘make decisions’, in the 
Community based natural resource management in Cambodia 
 26 
limited sense of the third moment of decision-making, but also the power to implement decisions 
in practice” (Hyland 1995:58).  
 
Hyland is hence, identifying participation in the decision-making process as effective political 
equality, where participants in their acts during the decision-making procedures have equal 
access to make decisions on all levels of the decision-making process, including equal access to 
information.  
 
Another issue in decision-making is power relations between participants. Even though the 
principle participation in decision-making processes rest on the political equality of the 
participants, power relations between the participants can affect the decision-making process. In 
the following section this issue will be discussed. 
 
 
Power in decision-making  
Power is a very difficult concept to define but also a very important concept in order to 
understand some vital questions about participation, like who participates, why do they 
participate, and how do they participate. In every democratic system, knowledge, wealth, social 
position and opportunities of access to the authorities are unequally distributed and this affects 
the power relations in a society.   
 
This section will capture the essence of power in decision-making, but since power can be 
executed at different levels, directly and indirectly and there essentially is power in every 
relation, at least according to Foucault, there is no direct definition that embraces power without 
it being too broad (Christensen & Jensen 2001:13ff). According to Christensen & Jensen (2001) 
power can be split into four dimensions; direct, indirect, latent (or consciousness controlling) and 
institutional power and these four dimensions are supplementing each other. Power is expressed 
in its different forms in a complex interaction, which varies in time and in the specific situations 
(Christensen & Jensen 2001:19). In the following each of the power dimensions will be 
explained. 
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Modified from Christensen 
& Jensen (2001:30) 
Decision-making arena 
Direct power 
In this first power dimension, some actors exercise power over other actors in connection with 
decision-making. Actors can be individuals and groups. Robert Dahl (1957 cited in Ham & Hill 
1993:66) defines power when “A has power over B to the extent that he can get B to do 
something that B would not do otherwise”; hence there is a relationship between political actors. 
Direct power is exercised in the decision-making process at the actual decision-making arena, 
from problems arrive until a decision has been made. The decision-making arena can for instance 
be in a general assembly, community meeting or other places where it is possible to delimit the 
participants.  
 
The decision-making process is activities that are carried out from a problem is raised on the 
agenda until a decision has been made and is centred around specific 
cases and a specific timeframe – that is, it has a starting and an ending 
time. In the simplified diagram by Christensen & Jensen (2001:30) it is 
shown how the problem or case is coupled with the decision and the 
activities carried out in between in the decision-making arena. It is in 
these activities the direct power is exercised. In the formulation of goals, 
interests and goals that are to be looked after in the decision-making are 
determined. These can often be of a general character since they have to 
take different and often conflicting interests into consideration. When 
seeking alternatives it is determined which alternatives should be 
considered, and here available resources (time and money) play an 
important role. Furthermore, power can be exercised when determining 
which alternatives should be considered. In the assessment of 
consequences alternatives are weighed against the goals where after a 
decision is made. “Power can be exercised through influence on the 
goals that are determined for the decision-making process, the 
alternatives that are considered and the consequences that are ascribed the alternatives, and 
finally the choice of solution that ends the decision-making process” (authors’ translation from 
Christensen & Jensen 2001:34).  
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If we return to the definition made by Robert Dahl, where one actor exercises power over another 
actor, the exercise of power is based in the relative power position the two actors have compared 
to each other. The power can be in the form of money, position, physical strength, support or 
knowledge, and these can be used to suppress or buy out the other actor. Often experts are used to 
support for instance politicians in their position and experts actually exercise power in a great 
deal of cases because of their knowledge. The actor with power determines the premises under 
which the other actors have to make decisions (Christensen & Jensen 2001:31ff); an example of 
this is developed countries’ conditionalities in relation to giving aid to developing countries. Here 
the developed countries are “buying” developing countries to do specific things in order to get 
development aid; and this is direct power exercise.  
 
Participation in relation to the direct power dimension is determined by the relative position and 
knowledge actors have compared to each other. In order to participate in the decision-making 
process it is necessary for actors to show which of their interests they would like others to 
recognize and in addition maybe try to mobilise other people with the same interests. The strategy 
of the opponent will be to try to make the conflicts of interests invisible or make the problem 
private (Christensen & Jensen 2001:35ff). This means that the problem is formulated in a narrow 
way like for instance by making deforestation a problem concerning the way the locals misuse 
the forest and not a wider societal problem, that are concerned with for instance the fact that 
locals are not able to participate in the decision-making processes concerning the use of the 
forest. 
 
Indirect power 
The second dimension is indirect power, which originally was defined by Bachrach and Baratz 
after criticizing the direct power concept of Robert Dahl. They saw Dahl’s power concept as too 
simple since power is also exercised outside the decision-making arena (Christensen & Jensen 
2001:46ff). This means that power can be exercised by hindering problems to reach the decision-
making arena; this is called non-decision-making. According to Bachrach and Baratz (1963 cited 
in Ham & Hill 1993:67-68) non-decision-making is “the practice of limiting the scope of actual 
decision-making to ‘safe’ issues by manipulating the dominant community values, myths, and 
political institutions and procedures”. Ham and Hill (1993:12) argue that non-decision-making 
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has become increasingly important and “that much political activity is concerned with 
maintaining the status quo, and resisting challenges to the existing allocation of values”.  
 
This non-decision-making can however be hard to identify but by identifying certain filters in the 
society1 it is possible to find the areas where non-decision-making is happening. Christensen and 
Jensen (2001:50) have identified the filters that are illustrating the indirect power, as can be seen 
in their model below. Filter one is hindering problems in entering the decision-making arena and 
the filter two is hindering decisions to be implemented in praxis. 
 
If we look at filter one, the exercise of power can be 
seen as a struggle about how to define the capacity 
and case-area of the decision-making arena 
(Christensen & Jensen 2001:51).This means that 
there is limited capacity in every decision-making 
arena to discuss problems and make decisions. As 
for the case-area different problems has to be 
handled different places, and by defining the 
problem not to concern a specific decision-making 
arena by some actors, power is exercised. 
Furthermore, requirements for participants to enter 
the decision-making arena, like knowledge about 
procedures, articulation-ability or timing of the 
decision-making can be a filter in itself and deter actors from participating in the decision-
making.  
 
Not all decisions made are being implemented and not all decisions have an unambiguous 
meaning, and this is what we understand as filter two. Decisions often contain different 
possibilities of interpretation, which means that implementers of the decision can interpret and 
hence implement the decisions as they find appropriate. This can be so the actual decisions about 
the implementation are made at a local level, but it can also be because decision-makers do not 
                                                 
1
 Bachrach and Baratz use four filters, whereas Christansen and Jensen use two which covers the content of meaning 
in Bachrach and Baratz’ filters (Christensen & Jensen 1993:49). We will also use the filters of Christensen and 
Jensen in this project. 
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have specific conflicts of interests in how the decisions are being implemented. Participation in 
the processes surrounding the filters is dependent on the actors’ location in the system. There is 
often great distance between decision-makers and implementers and this means that the actual 
decision made can be implemented in other ways as intended from the decision-makers’ side 
(Christensen & Jensen 2001:53ff). 
 
Latent power 
The third dimension of power is latent power or as Christensen and Jensen (2001:61) call it 
consciousness controlling power. Steven Lukes introduced this dimension in 1974 and he stated 
that this kind of power involves “the exercise of power to shape people’s preferences so that 
neither overt nor covert conflicts exist” (Ham & Hill 1993:70). As a contrast to the two previous 
dimensions of power, this kind of power does not involve direct observable actors or actions and 
analysis of conflicts between stakeholders. The latent power is hidden and is hindering conflicts 
to evolve even though conflicts of interest exist. The latent power is working as a filter before 
interests gets articulated or as Christensen and Jensen (2001:63) call it; before actors experience 
or understand their interests. In the model on the 
left, this exercise of latent power can be seen in the 
filter between the real interests and the articulated 
interests. Hence, “A exercises power over B when A 
affects B in a manner contrary to B’s interests” 
(Lukes 1974 cited in Ham & Hill 1993:70-71). This 
means that B’s ability, to understand or articulate his 
own interests, is blocked (Christensen & Jensen 
2991:62). Furthermore, the exercise of power is 
hidden from B; B does not know and see that 
someone else is shaping his interests. Hence, the 
actual conflicts are not understood by or shown to B.   
 
There are different aspects of power, which is absent 
in the two first power dimensions according to 
Lukes (cited in Christensen & Jensen 2001:64ff) and 
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these are lacking in order to understand the exercise of power. For instance, there are situations of 
authority, where an actor, despite an interest conflict, accepts that someone else have authority to 
decide in a specific situation. Manipulation is another aspect, where it is possible to shape and 
decide other people’s interests and goals. This means that what an actor thinks are his interests, 
are not his real interests, but actually A’s interests. Furthermore, instead of power being exercised 
by identifiable persons like in the case of the second power dimension, in this third power 
dimension, power can be exercised by groups, churches, classes in society or organisations.   
 
Articulated interests are actors’ subjective interests and these are identifiable. It is conversely 
more difficult to identify the real interests, because this means that the repressed interests should 
be perceived by B. According to Lukes, it is however possible for B to express his real interests if 
B can free himself from the influence of A through participation in the political life (Christensen 
& Jensen 2001:72). However, Christensen and Jensen (2001: 68ff) find this rather difficult, if not 
impossible and are of the opinion that in order to practically analyse the latent power, it is 
necessary to be able to identify deliberate attempts from the person in power and the tools used to 
affect the interests of B. Deliberate attempts can for instance be seen in extreme religious sects, 
commercials or in the upbringing of kids. People have conflicting articulated interests; it is a 
complex net of interests and they evolve around short term and long-term considerations or 
conflicts between individual and collective considerations. In attempts to affect people’s interests, 
people in power are trying to present a solution to the insecurity and conflict that exist in the 
complex net of people’s interests. Hence latent power is often about “presenting perceptions of a 
complicated reality, that makes it possible for the recipient – by unreflecting taking over this 
perception – to signal certain interests” (authors’ translation from Christensen & Jensen 
2001:79).     
 
Institutionalised power 
The fourth power dimension is institutionalised power, which is working as the framework within 
which people act. The structure of this is involving “conceptions about how the world is 
organised and works and what you can and cannot do, are able to and unable to do” (authors’ 
translation from Christensen & Jensen 2001:91); hence the institutional power exists inside 
people’s heads. The framework is represented in every kind of organisation at micro and macro 
level and the framework is based on standards of behaviour. These are established and have 
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evolved over time, and regulate the behaviour, routines and strategies of the actors. Furthermore 
they are reproducing themselves through the behaviour and are often taken for granted and not 
questioned; they are institutionalised. The distribution of advantages and burdens, and hence the 
situation the actor is in is the outcome of the institutionalised framework; it is not an outcome of 
deliberate actions (Christensen & Jensen 2001:89). Every person in a society does not possess the 
same values, routines and behaviour because these are determined by the political, social and 
economic position and status in the society. 
  
The institutionalised framework changes over time by actors’ actions. These changes can for 
instance be in gender structures, division of labour, decision-making standards and this can be 
caused by ideological or religious reasons, war, revolutions, new kinds of knowledge, 
reorganising of a system etc. The institutional framework can be a barrier for changes, but also be 
stabilising and sort out situations that can be difficult to oversee.          
 
In contradiction to the previous 3 dimensions of power, there are no direct power struggles 
between A and B in institutionalised power. In fact, while power struggles are going on in the 
first three dimensions, the institutionalised power is already distributing a great deal of the 
advantages and burdens between the competitors. The institutionalised effects are that advantages 
and burdens ‘automatically’ are distributed via behaviour and routines; hence the fourth 
dimension of power is encapsulating the three other power dimensions. (Christensen & Jensen 
2001:95). “As long as A and B agree, that the difference between them is the power, that one of 
them have and the other one wishes to have, and let this be the starting point for their handling of 
interests, just as long will they without reflection maintain the framework for their reciprocal 
relationship” (authors’ translation from Christensen & Jensen 2001:95).    
 
The four power dimensions created by Christensen and Jensen (2001) have now been explained. 
The model is simple, and even though reality is not so simple, the model is picturing where in the 
policy process power and power relations play a vital role and especially how power is exercised. 
Through this model it is also possible to identify where it is possible for people to influence on 
the policy process and in the decision-making. In the following participation and power will be 
discussed. 
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If Hyland’s terms are integrated into the model of Christensen & Jensen, as can be seen in the 
model on the next page, we can see that they, more or less, use the same terms in describing the 
policy process. Any kind of power in the decision-making process, where A is affecting the 
choice of B in one way or another will, according to Hyland, be undemocratic. This section will 
discuss the two approaches together and bring forward examples that can illustrate how power 
and participation are affecting each other in the decision-making process.  
 
First of all, it is necessary to understand that above the main areas in the policy process the 
institutional power dimension is creating the framework for the participation. Institutional 
settings are vital for the ability for people to participate; especially since national regulations are 
controlling whether or not participation by the people can take place and how it can take place. 
The institutional framework both determines how much power local authorities have but also 
who the local authorities are and where they have a say. This is vital to understand since the 
institutional settings are determining many actions by people, both decision-makers and 
participants.  
 
Agenda setting  
If we return to the integrated 
model (on the left), interests 
are a main component in the 
agenda setting. According to 
Christensen & Jensen (2001), 
there are two main filters, 
which hold back interests 
from the decision-making 
arena; the latent filter that 
hinders people in articulating 
their interests; and filter one 
that hinders people in being 
heard. These two components 
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are making it difficult for people to be heard when agendas are determined. In cases where this 
kind of power is used, it is difficult for people to be involved unless they are part of a strong 
organisation or interest group or they are supported by people in the decision-making arena.  
 
Manipulation is one of the methods that can be applied when latent power is being exercised; this 
can for instance take place when people are misinformed or lack access to relevant information, 
without being aware of it. Even though people formally have political equality in setting the 
agenda power relations are hindering people in participating equally. However, as previously 
mentioned people, who are exposed to latent power, are not aware of their true interests and are 
hence not aware that they do not have political equality. Here interest groups can play a vital role, 
if they are able to expose people to the problems in society. This can for instance be in the case of 
an environmental problem such as air pollution from an industry, which is kept hidden, but where 
the interest group is exposing the problem to people. Then people’s interests might change to 
demands of environmental precautions from the industry.  
 
As for filter one which is constraining people’s interests in being heard, indirect power is 
hindering problems to reach the decision-making arena. Lack of knowledge about the decision-
making procedures in interest groups or transfer of responsibilities to other decision-making 
arenas is some of the ways that indirect power can be exercised. Here education can play a vital 
role when stakeholders are acting, and strong stakeholders can through their knowledge and 
exercise of indirect power pre-determine the outcome of the decision. 
 
Comparative assessment and decision-making  
On the decision-making arena, during comparative analysis and actual decision-making, direct 
power can be used in order to affect participants to agree on something they would not otherwise 
agree upon; hence in the decision-making, power is being exercised between stakeholders where 
one has more power than the other. This can be in the formulation of goals, where participants are 
being undermined in the articulation of which goals are important; or it can be when seeking 
alternatives and the cheapest alternative is considered in order to keep the costs at a minimum, 
even though it does not give the same benefits. In a development context direct power can for 
instance be used by a funding agency that has taken the initiative to solve a certain problem in a 
community and will only implement a project if certain conditions are fulfilled. According to 
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Hyland’s approach to democracy the use of direct power does not give political equality, since 
decisions between alternatives, where only some of the persons involved in the process are taking 
part, is pre-determining the final outcomes of the decision. Furthermore, by giving certain people 
veto in the decision-making or letting their votes count for more than others, the political equality 
is also undermined. When some people have more power to determine things than others the 
equality disappears and participation in determining the outcome of the decision is not equal. 
 
Implementation 
In the implementation decision-makers can exercise indirect power by making decisions 
impossible to implement or by implementing them in a different way than initially intended. This 
means that the participants do not benefit from the initiatives and there might not be any 
incentives for them to participate. This is especially an issue when decisions are implemented in 
other ways than decided. This is undermining the actual decision; the political equality that has 
been present throughout the decision-making process is undermined when the decision is not 
implemented.  
 
In regard to implementation there are some additional important aspects that are interesting to 
discuss. According to Winter (1990:21) the outcome or the impact of an implementation is a very 
important variable for determining success or failure of a given project. Winter argues that the 
implementation outcome of a decision is determined by four socio-political conditions; (i) the 
policy formation process, (ii) the organisational and inter-organisational implementation 
behaviour, (iii) the street-level bureaucratic behaviour, and (iv) the target group response and 
other changes in society (Winter 1990:20ff).  
 
The policy formation process is, as described before, an important determinant for the outcome of 
the implementation since some policies can be very difficult to implement. Competing interests 
affect policymaking and according to Winter (1990:25) policy proponents as well as opponents 
engage in structuring the implementation process. Hence it can be possible for policy opponents 
to structure the implementation process so the policy is not effectively implemented (Winter 
1990:25). However, some of the main constraints in the policy formation process for the 
implementation has been described throughout this chapter and will therefore not be discussed 
any further here.  
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If we turn to the organisational and inter-organisational implementation behaviour this has to do 
with how organisations or inter-organisational relationships respond to policy mandates. In the 
implementation of policies, one or more organisations often participate and these organisations 
are composed of participants that give priority to goals that can be conflicting with the policy. For 
instance politicians in state or local government can disagree with the objectives of a policy and 
this can lead to delays, problems of coordination or implementation failures (Winter 1990:27). 
According to Winter (1990:27) “implementation output and outcomes are affected by 
organizational interests and incentives of the organization or organizations that participate in 
the implementation process”. There can be actors that have more power in the implementation 
process than they had during the policy formation and they are often striving to obtain their own 
goals in the implementation. This is however, related to individuals in organisations that are 
following the interests of the organisation. If we look at the individual level, this is where the 
third socio-political condition, behaviour of street-level bureaucrats comes in. 
 
Street-level can be seen as the real policy-makers since they are the ones who are translating laws 
and programs into action by delivering a service or trying to regulate the behaviour of the citizens 
(Winter 1990:31). However, since the street-level bureaucrats themselves perceive the resources 
of street-level bureaucrats as insufficient, they often give priority to easier, routine cases instead 
of the complicated, time-consuming cases. Winter (1990) has no explanation why street-level 
bureaucrats perceive their workload to be big, but suggests that organisational culture could be a 
reason. 
 
The final socio-political condition is target-group behaviour and socioeconomic conditions which 
is dealing with how the target-group is responding to policies (Winter 1990:33). Many policies 
are aiming at changing the behaviour of the citizens in order to solve problems in society, but 
many different things affect people’s behaviour. It is necessary to understand why people respond 
to the implementation process the way they do especially because the implementation also is 
determined by the willingness of the target-group to participate. Additionally, the communication 
of regulations and the right to services are very important. According to Winter (1990:35) in 
order for people to be motivated to comply with the regulation, when they are known with it, and 
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for the implementation to be successful, the prescriptions of the regulation has to be in accord 
with already existing norms and behaviours. 
 
The four conditions are inter-related since they affect each other. According to Winter (1990:38) 
the most important interrelationships are the policy formation process’ impact on the three other 
conditions, the impact on street-level bureaucratic and target group behaviour from the 
organisational and inter-organisational implementation behaviour, and the impact of street-level 
bureaucratic behaviour on the target groups. These interrelationships will be discussed in chapter 
six when the cases are discussed with the theory.  
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Chapter 4: Natural resources 
 
Development projects are mainly concerned with poverty and many people in the developing 
regions are relying on natural resources for their livelihoods, especially since many of them are 
farmers, farm labourers or small-scale producers of services or manufactured goods (Cypher & 
Dietz 1997:331). Furthermore, growth in the rural sector has been associated with environmental 
and resource problems such as deforestation, water salinization, fish stock depletion, biodiversity 
losses etc. (Lutz & Esmail 1999:77).  
 
The concept ‘resource’ means something which is usable and it originally highlighted that nature 
had the power to self-regenerate; that the re-source rises again and again (Shiva 1992). However, 
the understanding of the concept has changed and the ability of resources to regenerate is 
understood as being dependent on people; the generation of revenues and growth of capital has 
made people ‘develop’ the resources in a planned manner (Shiva 1992). Hence, as natural 
resources have become degraded and scarce it has become necessary to manage the resources in 
order to keep a continued supply for commercial purposes. According to Shiva (1992) 
“’Management of natural resources’ has therefore been a managerial fix for resource scarcity 
resulting from the uncontrolled destruction of nature”.  
 
Natural resources are many things; they are characterised by a change in space and time and 
therefore proper management of the resources is a multifaceted matter. This chapter will discuss 
natural resources; first it will be discussed what the term ‘natural resources’ embrace and 
thereafter some of the constraints and possibilities there are in natural resource management will 
be discussed. This will be done in order to understand how complex an issue management of the 
natural resources is and which important aspects need to be kept in mind in natural resource 
management.  
 
  
Various characters of resources 
Natural resources can, among other things, be split into renewable and non-renewable resources. 
This way of characterising resources is determined by a time factor; the renewables are resources 
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like forest and fish because they are able to re-grow in a near future and non-renewable resources 
are oil or the ozone layer because they are not able to re-grow within the near future. The non-
renewable resources will not be discussed here, since these are not the focus of this report; this 
section will mainly discuss the renewable natural resources since these are at the centre of 
attention in Cambodia’s community based natural resource management. The initiatives that we 
will look into in the case examples in chapter five involving local management of natural 
resources are community fishery and community forestry.  
 
Even though renewable resources are able to re-grow in the near future, it is still possible to 
eradicate them, for instance animals or tree species of a certain kind, if they are overused. Hence, 
even though these resources are renewable they are in danger of being destroyed if they are not 
managed properly. The management of resources is however not a simple thing, where the same 
methods can be applied to all the resources. Renewable natural resources can, among other 
things, be split into two categories; mobile and static resources. Other factors that influence the 
characteristics of the resources are the size of the resource and the changes over time. This will be 
considered in the following. 
  
Static and mobile resources 
Destruction of any mobile and static resources can have a major negative impact on the people 
whose livelihoods depend on these. There is however a difference between the impacts from 
destruction of mobile and static resources. Resources that are mobile can for instance be fish, 
especially migratory fish that move from one place to another to spawn or find food. Over-fishing 
in one area will affect all the fish resources in another area, and thereby also the fisheries in this 
area. Destruction of breeding grounds or pollution of a river, which affects the fish stock, is also 
examples of how effects on mobile natural resources in one place can have impacts other places. 
Static resources, like the forest can have an impact on people in other locations when they for 
instance loose a source of wood for building materials or their fields for agriculture are destroyed 
by soil erosion; however, the impacts are not direct like lack of fish for livelihood sustenance but 
rather an indirect impact on other people. It is hence possible to separate resources into mobile 
and static resources and the impacts into direct and indirect impacts. However, the destruction of 
one resource can affect other resources; deforestation can cause soil erosions, which can affect 
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the river and thereby destroy the breeding areas for the fish. These indirect effects on other 
resources will then have a direct effect on other people. 
 
Changes in the resources over time also play a role in the management. Dry and wet seasons can 
affect the management of the resources; more water in a lake affects the fishing; but also fishing 
in breeding seasons can have a major impact on the stock of the fish. It is hence important to 
consider different seasons in the management of such resources. 
 
The static and mobile resources will have to be managed differently; this does however not mean 
that you can apply one method for all static resources, but it does mean that the impacts from 
destruction of static resources are different than from mobile resources.  
 
The mobile resources are a challenge for local managers since water or animals (e.g. fish in a 
lake) are moving. Unclear boundaries of fishing areas are a major problem and it is not easy to set 
a clear boundary for such migratory resources. Over-fishing in one location can affect everybody 
living in the region and furthermore have an effect on the nation and neighbouring counties, 
especially in the case of fishing in rivers or seas. Hence, it can be difficult for a single community 
to control the stock since fish are moving around. It might therefore be necessary to have an 
authority that controls the stock and distribute quotas to the involved stakeholders in order for the 
fishing to be kept at a sustainable level.  
 
The static resources remain in a delimited area and are hence easier to keep control of than 
mobile resources. However, even though managers have a territorial attachment to the resource; 
that is if they live near the resource, they are not necessarily able to manage the resource alone. 
As stated by Agrawal & Gibson (1999:634) “the territorial attachment of small groups may make 
them inappropriate managers for particular resources because the geographical spread of the 
resource (large watersheds, forests, lakes, etc.) could be larger than a small community could 
ever hope to control”. Thus the size of the resource does matter; a huge area of forest can be 
difficult to control by a single community; especially if other actors or communities are acting 
within the area.  
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Damage of the static resources can have a direct impact on the communities or actors who live 
from these resources; a loss in forest resources will decrease the available resources for their 
livelihoods and hence have a negative effect on the livelihoods of these people. Additionally, 
there can be impacts on a larger scale, which means less timber on the market and increased 
market prices. The management of the static resources can, depending on the size, be handled by 
local communities if they are provided with the right tools, both in terms of equipment and 
education.  
 
 
Commercialisation 
One of the factors making natural resources a big issue on the political arena is that natural 
resources have been commercialised. This means that the resources are being used as goods and 
services on the market, like furniture, food, tourist attractions etc. The increased demand for 
goods and services has increased the pressure on the natural resources but also increased the 
pressure on people who traditionally have been living from these resources and this leads to 
conflicts. The combination of commercialisation and traditional livelihoods has made regulations 
on natural resources necessary in order to find a sustainable level for the use of the natural 
resources. The question is however, how the regulations are to look in a world where economic 
considerations are important for industrialised as well as developing countries. Some of the 
problems in relation to commercialisation and natural resources are the conditions the 
commercial sector is dependent on. It is necessary for commercial industries to continually earn 
money in order to be able to pay back for investments and be able to compete with other 
industries. Hence the natural resources that are being harvested are often being exploited to the 
maximum and as quick as possible. This can be a consequence when international companies are 
harvesting natural resources, since they have the ability to move to other locations when the 
resource is used.  
  
Furthermore, in combination with a discussion about commercialisation the issue of biodiversity 
arises. According to FAO’s Forest Resource Assessment (FRA) in 2000 the deforestation rate 
globally had decreased since the last FRA in 1990 (FAO 2001). However, the decrease in 
deforestation rate is a product of an increase in establishment of forest plantations. Forest 
plantations are established globally at a rate of 4.5 million ha per year; however, industrial 
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plantations account for 48 % of these (ibid:11ff), so these ‘forest’ areas are to disappear again. 
Furthermore, this also means that the forest plantation areas are not diverse in species since 
industries usually establish plantations with species that are often fast growing.  
 
The role of technology 
Another important aspect in relation to natural resources and commercialisation is technology. 
The introduction of technology in the use of natural resources has made the exploitation of 
natural resources easier and in some cases more destroying. In the forestry sector, technology in 
the form of for instance the chain saw made the felling of trees easier and hence the work more 
effective. However, it also made it easier for the whole sector to expand and large areas of forest 
have disappeared in short time. Technology in regard to fishing has also changed; however, it has 
not expanded in the same speed to rural people as in forestry. It is mainly larger commercial 
industries that have the resources to use the new technologies and the problem is not yet as 
widespread in fishing as in forestry.  
 
Technology is however not only a problem; it has also solved problems for rural people who use 
the natural resources as a source of livelihood. Technological changes has made things easier for 
people; things that earlier took much time are now quick. This leaves time for people to do other 
things; and it can be a way of diversifying their livelihoods. However, in poor areas where 
income-generating activities are few, the improved technology also gives locals incentives to use 
the resources in unsustainable ways since it is an easy source of income. In the following section 
we will discuss which considerations need to be taken in natural resource policy development in 
developing countries. 
 
 
Natural Resource Policies 
Development projects and policies dealing with natural resource management are often involving 
questions of resource allocation. The issue is important since what we do today with the resources 
has consequences tomorrow; trees harvested today will take decades to regenerate; fish caught 
today cannot breed tomorrow and so on. More specifically the question of resource allocation is 
often concerning policies about conservation versus exploitation.  
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People have different interests in natural resources and these may be backed by political 
influence, legal rights and economic resources or by none of these. The impact of the different 
interests varies from place to place. “The job of a policy includes balancing (…) interests, and 
charting paths to solve problems created by the excessive influence of some and by the lack of 
influence of others” (Mayers & Bass 1998:269). 
  
Conservation, imposed on local communities in areas where they are very dependent on the 
natural resources, through a top-down strategy can entail huge social and ecological costs 
(Pimbert and Pretty 1997). Some conservation policies can force people to resettle in other areas, 
where no considerations to job and livelihood opportunities might have been taken. Other 
problems have appeared when restrictions on people’s use of the natural resources have been 
taken; for instance by establishing national parks with no access and user rights for local people. 
According to Pimbert and Pretty (1997:2) local people’s incentives to conserve natural resources 
are severely reduced when they are denied use of these. Furthermore, conservation often reflects 
priorities of regional, national or international interests and not of local livelihoods. This is why 
participation is necessary in natural resource management; “Policies for community based 
conservation clearly need to reaffirm and protect local rights of ownership and use over 
biological resources, - for ethical as well as practical reasons” (Pimbert & Pretty 1997:6). It is 
hence necessary to create mechanisms in policy-making that link policy development efforts with 
the realities on-the-ground since this can generate acceptable outcomes for all interest groups. 
 
It is however necessary to bear in mind that stakeholder interests and perceptions are not static 
and furthermore, there will be environmental and economic change beyond the control of 
stakeholders. According to Mayers & Bass (1998:270) the problem is that “policy processes are 
not well set up to make decisions about how to deal with rapid change”. Often the direct agents 
of environmental problems are directed in policymaking, for instance local people’s resource use. 
The problem is however, that there are often underlying root causes to these problems; and policy 
and institutional failures are at the root of many problems. These can arise far away from the 
actual environmental impact; in national or international policies.   
 
Not only direct policies aiming towards a specific environmental problem can affect how natural 
resources are used. Other policy influences can be just as powerful, like those concerning land 
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ownership, government revenues or macro-economic policies. People can react either to push or 
pull factors when they use natural resources. Push factors are elements that force agents to for 
instance deforest because they do not have alternatives whereas pull factors are elements that 
make agents deforest in anticipation of further benefits (Wunder 2000). Push factors can be tax 
policies on agrochemicals, which make poor people unable to apply these and thereby not get 
sufficient output to sustain their livelihoods. This can force people to take up alternative methods 
to survive, like extension of agricultural land into forestland. A pull factor can be land tenure 
policies that are allowing people to claim deforested land. This can give people incentives to cut 
down the forest in anticipation of claiming ownership of the land. Hence, policies should not be 
seen in a single light, but more be seen as a complex set of regulations. 
 
 
Stakeholders 
There are many different stakeholders in natural resource management, and since one of the main 
concepts of the project is community based natural resource management, this section will 
especially discuss the community as a stakeholder and the problems related to community as a 
stakeholder. 
 
When participatory strategies in natural resource management are implemented, it is necessary to 
take the local situation into consideration. The social, economic, institutional and political 
environments play a role in the local society and these are important elements when 
implementing management plans for the natural resources. Here especially the fact that 
communities are not a homogeneous group of people is important. Community is not a unified 
and organic whole, even if a community consist of a group of people sharing same cultural 
background; ethnicity, religion and language. There are differences within the community – 
different interests, social status and different views on how to use the resources (Agrawal & 
Gibson 1999).  
 
Especially gender differences are an aspect, which has gained increased attention in development 
work. The gender aspect has sometimes been forgotten and women have not had the same 
opportunities to participate in development projects on the same conditions as men. As Maguire 
(1996, cited in Cornwall 2002:28) expresses it “If women had unequal access to project 
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participation, then women no doubt had unequal access to any project benefits”. Considerations 
on gender issues are hence necessary in participatory strategies in order to reach women in 
development work. The gender aspect of development processes has been given a central role in 
many recent development projects and is a cross sector issue in many sector programs. 
  
In order to understand the factors critical to success or failure in efforts aiming at local 
management, it is important to assess “the multiple actors with multiple interests that make up 
communities, the processes through which these actors interrelate and, especially, the 
institutional arrangements that structure their interactions” (Agrawal & Gibson 1999:636). 
Recognition of community made up by a multiple of interests makes the empowering process of 
local people to manage the resources more than just a decentralisation process. The patterns of 
diversity in local community are essential if long-term sustainability of resource management is 
to be obtained. If the implementation of a certain policy or project has to be empowering and 
sustainable it has to take into consideration that the structures in society are complex and ever-
changing. People have different interests in the policy or project and it makes their incentives for 
participating diverse as well; their preferences for resource use and distribution are not the same.  
 
Conflict can occur among different interest groups within the community. This can be due to their 
different perceptions and their desired role in society. The composition of a community is an 
important factor influencing on community participation. According to Botes & van Rensburg, 
(2000:49) the more diverse the community, the less participation of people due to divisions in 
language, rights, wealth, age, gender, or politics.  
 
The local level power structures and incentives controlling behaviour are dynamic; they change 
over time and space. This means that the implementation of a project is affected by the internal 
interaction in the local community at a given time; the negotiation over the use and distribution of 
natural resources. Furthermore, the community and its actions and behaviour are linked to a 
larger social context. The implementation of for instance a government project aiming towards 
resource conservation and involving community participation is a component from the larger 
social context that affects the local community. The fact that a government has agreed to 
conserve a certain natural resource at a national level, directly affects people’s livelihood at a 
local level. Additionally, there are for instance demographic changes or technological progress in 
Community based natural resource management in Cambodia 
 46 
the larger society that affects the local community. Hence it is not possible to talk about 
community without talking about the larger societal context like for instance the state.  
 
Institutional arrangements in relation to for instance natural resource management can be formal 
or informal rules and norms that affect the actions and interactions of human beings (Agrawal & 
Gibson 1999:637). These arrangements both constrain and facilitate activities, and in order for 
authority at local level to manage resources effectively, local actors have to: (i) make rules about 
the use, management, and conservation of resources; (ii) implement the rules that are created; (iii) 
resolve disputes that arise during interpretation and application of rules (Agrawal & Gibson 
1999:638).  
 
Often only certain groups of people are allowed to be involved in development processes. This is 
often more educated, wealthy, or more vocal persons in society. In some cases community 
organizations are not elected democratically, and as a result the ‘elected’ people often respond to 
groups supporting them and tend to forget views of other groups. This practice causes problems 
since decision-makers are often not those who experience poverty. A big problem in this kind of 
participation is community-renting which occurs when development agencies buy the support and 
goodwill of key interest groups in the community. Here the development agency identifies 
community partners instead of the community itself and there is then a risk that decisions will be 
made by a small clique in the community. The decision-makers in the community may work for 
their own advantages and disregard others in the community. Self-centred behaviour of dominant 
groups can limit active participation, and create lack of participation from the weaker and more 
vulnerable groups.  
 
The role of governments in development processes is of course very important since decisions in 
management of natural resources will have redistributive effects and there will hence be winners 
and losers (Bass et al. 1995). In the political dimension of community participation, some 
governments use participation as a means to maintain their power. The state employs community 
participation programs in order to maintain the existing power structures rather than to mitigate 
poverty. The government uses community participation as a tool to control the society and to 
legitimise the power system. At the state level, participation is often constrained due to 
partisanship, limited funds, rigidity, bureaucracy and the state’s limited capacity. In these 
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situations the distribution of benefits mainly depends on political interests, which undermine the 
ability of people to participate on equal conditions. 
 
NGOs can be seen as better implementers of participatory projects (Cornwall 2002) since they are 
able to embrace a diversity of understandings and practices. There are however different 
perspectives on this matter. Some NGOs are independent from political influence, whereas some 
are dependent on funding from government agencies and this can affect their work in a certain 
direction dictated by the funding government. Yet, NGOs are not representative of the local 
people; it is therefore not a more democratic approach to development work. Local authorities are 
often locally elected and their solutions should therefore illustrate the needs in the local area, 
whereas the NGOs are external actors and they do not necessarily have the same legitimacy as 
local authorities. In countries with problems of corruption, the legitimacy of local authorities can 
however be discussed.  
 
 
Communities and natural resources relationship 
As discussed in the previous sections there are different natural resources and different 
stakeholders in natural resource management. The focus of this project is community based 
natural resource management and this section will hence discuss potentials for combining natural 
resource management with community management. This will be done by discussing how local 
knowledge can be a part of a management strategy and by discussing co-management between 
stakeholders.  
  
Local knowledge has become important in natural resources management discussions, especially 
in regard to the issue about local management. Local people have in many instances been seen as 
the only good conservers of natural resources since they until commercialisation have been living 
in harmony with nature (Leach et. al 1997:8ff). Hence local knowledge about natural resources 
and the conservation of these can be perceived as the most important knowledge in regard to local 
management of natural resources. Everybody does however not share this understanding. 
    
According to Blaikie et al (1997:218) “Knowledge concerns the way people understand the 
world, the ways in which they interpret and apply meaning to their experiences” and knowledge 
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is hence linked to the context it is found within. Local knowledge can be perceived as non-
scientific and irrational, especially in a top-down approach, and in this approach local knowledge 
should be replaced by technology which has been derived scientifically; a transfer of technology 
(Blaikie et al. 1997:220). In opposition to this is the bottom-up approach, where local knowledge 
or indigenous knowledge is used as a part of a development strategy to develop technologies that 
fit the local circumstances. 
 
Local knowledge and scientific knowledge can be used differently but none of the two are 
necessarily better than the other. Local methods for natural resource management are not 
necessarily more sustainable than other methods; it is however necessary to understand local 
methods and why they are applied in order to understand which new methods can be applied and 
how. In order to obtain sustainable methods for natural resource management it is necessary to 
combine already obtained knowledge about resource management from local people with 
information on how to improve management methods, for instance from external facilitators who 
have experience from other situations or areas. Scientific knowledge can furthermore be very 
useful when funding is applied for. Scientific knowledge has in many cases a status as often 
being more reliable than people’s perceptions of issues and therefore this type of knowledge can 
be used in combination with local knowledge. Furthermore, if we look at the sustainability 
discussion, scientific knowledge on biological issues, like when the harvest of fish is 
unsustainable makes a good supplement to local knowledge. 
 
Local knowledge can be used in the development of community based management methods, but 
in addition to this, the overall management of the resources can be done in different ways. One of 
the management methods introduced in Cambodia is co-management. According to Leach et al 
(1997:5) co-management is “an appropriate sharing of responsibilities for natural resource 
management between national and local governments, civic organisations, and local 
communities”. Co-management is intended to involve the local communities in order for them not 
to end up as passive recipients of development activities but instead be active in the projects. 
According to Hartmann (2000, cited in Thay et al. 2005:122), co-management is a “formalized 
and replicable process of sharing authority and responsibility by government and organized user 
groups in decentralized decision making aiming at improved resource management” while Gum 
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(2000, cited in Thay et al. 2005:122) define it as the “provision of neutral facilitation and the 
promotion of dialogue between stakeholders.”  
 
Hence, co-management is a corporative arrangement where responsibilities are shared among the 
relevant stakeholders ranged from local people to national government, NGOs, and International 
Organizations (IOs). These stakeholders are involved in the decision-making process regarding 
management of the natural resources. This kind of management can be useful especially since the 
mobile or very large natural resources can be difficult for individual communities to manage 
alone. Furthermore, there is a need for cooperation between local users in the management of for 
instance small, local resources. This also means that each of the stakeholders can use their 
individual skills in the management but also needs to acknowledge the skills of the others and 
thereby the power they possess on the specific issue.  
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Chapter 5: CBNRM in Cambodia 
 
The aim of this chapter is to introduce and discuss the natural resource management in Cambodia. 
Natural resource management does not consist of a simple method that can be applied to all 
natural resources, but is hence a concept that is specific in time and space. This means that the 
natural resource management discussed in this chapter is specific for Cambodia, but can also be 
specific for the particular locations and the time in the case examples. 
 
The chapter will introduce the natural resource management for the case examples of inland 
fisheries and forestry in Cambodia; the differences and similarities. Focus for this section will be 
on the institutional structure of forestry and fishery and on the participation and decision-making 
in connection to the natural resource management. This discussion will lead to chapter six where 
the power, decision-making and participation in relation to the case examples will be discussed.   
 
 
Decentralisation in Cambodia 
In 1996 the Royal Government of Cambodia (RGC) began implementing a decentralisation 
framework, named Seila (which means foundation stone). The program is a coordination and 
mobilisation framework to support the decentralisation and deconcentration in Cambodia on 3 
levels of society; commune, province and national levels. The goal is “to contribute to poverty 
alleviation through good governance, and to institute decentralized and deconcentrated systems 
and strategies to manage sustainable local development” (Seila Program Office 2005). The 
implementation of the framework has been a gradual process, where the first stage was an 
experiment model launched by the government to strengthen local governance systems. The main 
emphasis was on poverty reduction through decentralization and capacity building was the main 
task of this program. In the second phase, in 2003, the Seila program commenced implementation 
of its Natural Resource and Environment Management (NREM) with mainstreaming strategies in 
order to promote the NREM at the three levels of government.  
 
The implementation of decentralization means that power is being distributed from the central 
level to the local level with the purpose of improving governance structures. This shift in 
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Cambodian governance calls for attention on roles and responsibilities of related sectors. In 
regard to natural resources management, commune councils have the responsibility to involve 
local people in the management of the resources. However, due to the unclear boundaries of 
responsibilities, where some responsibilities overlap within and among institutions and 
organisation, there is still a great job to solve in order to achieve effective decentralised 
management (Carson et al. 2005).  
 
Both the RGC and NGOs in Cambodia began implementing community based natural resource 
management in response to the rapid degradation of natural resources. In community based 
natural resource management local communities are responsible for the management of the local 
resources. According to Carson et al. (2005:37), the term CBNRM refers to “a diversity of co-
management approaches that strive to empower local communities to participate actively in the 
conservation and sustainable management of natural resources”. However, Carson et al. (2005) 
adds that most CBNRM initiatives in Cambodia are more controlled by the government than by 
communities.  
 
There are a variety of CBNRM practices in Cambodia such as community fishery, community 
forestry, participatory land use planning and participatory protected area management. The goals 
of CBNRM are i) to empower communities and ii) to obtain ecosystem conservation, but so far 
the goals have primarily been related to conservation, subsistence living and household 
consumption and not poverty reduction, livelihood improvement and community empowerment 
(ibid).  
 
According to van Acker (2003b:11) “Natural resources are locally specific, diverse, have 
multiple users, and require local knowledge in designing their management.” Local participation 
is a core factor when arranging and implementing community based natural resource 
management. Decentralization enables transfer of power to the local communities, and this can 
further enable effective participation by local people in natural resource management. The 
ongoing decentralisation process in Cambodia can be a promising means to make CBNRM more 
effective, since it will change the mobilisation of people from an ad hoc process to more a 
institutionalised form of participation (van Acker 2003b:11). Moreover, decentralization can 
provide opportunities to increase the cooperation between village and commune level, and 
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thereby increase the chances for creating reliable procedures for more equity and efficient 
outcome. 
  
According to Degen & Thuok (1998:3) the Cambodian community is hierarchical and built upon 
a patron-client relationship, which is insurance for security and protection. There are no 
indigenous, traditional or organised groups or associations in traditional Cambodian 
communities; the pagoda has the unifying function to solve community matters (ibid:3). The 
Cambodian society is also characterised by its individualism where there are close personal links 
within families and not the community (Pellini 2004:5). For instance small-scale fishery has been 
carried out at household level and not in organised groups within a community. The 
decentralisation process in Cambodia is hence dealing with restructuring the traditional 
community structures and has to build new institutions; it is not possible to reorganise already 
existing organisational community structures. 
 
 
Forestry 
Forest in Cambodia includes evergreen, deciduous and flooded forest. Of the total land in 
Cambodia, nearly 70 percent is designated as forest reserves, and of these reserves, nearly 60 
percent was allocated for forest concessions in 1997, 30 percent was for conservation purposes 
and 10 percent was for other purposes like agriculture, fishing concessions and military 
(Lindayati 2000:31). The Forest Law declares that all forest land of Cambodia belongs to the 
state (ibid:31; Braeutigam 2003:14). There are two central ministries in charge of these resources, 
however with different purposes; Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries (MAFF) 
manages the forests for timber production, whereas Ministry of Environment (MoE) manages 
forests for biodiversity conservation purposes and protection of the areas. Furthermore, in policy 
development the National Assembly, the Prime Minister and the National Inter-ministerial 
Steering Committee under the Council of Ministers are all involved (Braeutigam 2003:15). 
However, there have been several incidents with higher-level officials and provincial 
governments allocating forest use without consultation with the relevant ministries (Lindayati 
2000:31). 
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Demarcation of the forests and its uses is done by the government without consultation of the 
local people, but many of the forests have been inhabited and used by rural people for many 
generations, and this has created conflicts between rural users and other users, like 
concessionaries, timber industries etc. (Lindayati 2000:31). The forest resources are a vital 
resource to the national economic growth and local people whose livelihoods depend on these 
resources for subsistence. The Cambodian forests are very attractive resources to some elites such 
as government authorities and military who use the forests to gain income or ‘buy political 
loyalty’. Furthermore, according to Poffenberger (1999) “After the Vietnamese invaded 
Cambodia in 1978 and established the Hun Sen government, the Khmer Rouge took refuge in the 
forests to the west, supporting their operations through timber sales.”  
 
The forestry sector in Cambodia has been declining since the 1990s. Until the 1990s Cambodia 
was rather isolated and there was no trade in forest products, and the forests of Cambodia were in 
relatively good conditions. However, the good conditions of the forests were not a result of 
effective forest policies, and this was seen in the 1990s when Cambodia opened up to the world 
market and the quickly expanding trade in forest products and agricultural products destroyed the 
forests (Sustainable Forest Management Project 2000). The forest degradation is believed to be 
the result of governance and management failure and with the absence of a continuing 
improvement of governance and management of the resources, forest will, according to 
Henderson (2005), become a ‘memory of past wealth’.  
 
History of Forest Management 
Cambodia has witnessed many different types of forest management. Traditionally indigenous 
knowledge was used in management and utilisation of the forest resources; especially by hill 
tribes in the northeastern highlands. However, these traditions and the indigenous knowledge 
have disappeared due to centralization, bureaucracy and technocracy of forest governance during 
the colonial and post-colonial period (Braeutigam 2003:8).  
 
During the French colony, a system of ‘collection permits’ controlled the volume and timing of 
logging by loggers and authorities, whereas during the Khmer Rough regime forestland was 
cleared for agricultural purposes. During the 1980s, the Forestry Department had a direct function 
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in forest harvesting and logging operations while ‘solidarity groups’ could gain rights to harvest 
timber and sell it to the Forestry Department at fixed prices.   
 
In the late 1980s, it was noted that the exploitation of the forest was increasing since “various 
political and military fractions, Thai military officers, and businessmen engaged in rapid cutting 
and sale of valuable tropical hardwood species” (McKenny & Tola 2002:81). The forest 
exploitation continued into the 1990s and according to McKenney & Tola (2002) three of the 
major political parties in Cambodia, Cambodian People’s Party, FUNCINPEC and the Khmer 
Rouge were severely involved in logging, especially in the areas they controlled. In 1994, the 
newly elected government granted the Ministry of National Defence the role of controlling the 
exports of timber. Accordingly, the military’s role in logging was solidified and also the 
government was planning to gain income from timber for the Royal Cambodian Army’s 
campaign against the Khmer Rouge.  
 
The government introduced the systems of ‘collection permits’ and ‘forest concession’ 
management in 1994; systems that had existed in Cambodia before the Khmer Rouge regime. As 
for the collection permits, Council of Ministers, Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fishery 
(MAFF), Ministry of National Defence, and other authorities of high rank provided the collection 
permits to timber companies, military groups, forest concessionaires, etc. The purpose was to 
avoid loss of valuable resources through collection of old logs left from illegal logging. However, 
the authorised groups or individuals that gathered the illegal logs mainly ended up exercising 
illegal logging and the collection permits volume hence stemmed from illegal logging and not old 
log. Special harvest permits for substantial volumes of timber were also granted to armed forces; 
however, there is no record of these authorisations. Furthermore, military commanders and 
provincial government officials were also involved in the logging, however without authorisation 
(Mckenny & Tola 2002:82). In the Prime Minister’s Declaration No. 1 of January 1999 the 
issuing of new collection permits was banned and existing ones were invalidated.   
 
In relation to the forest concession management, the Royal Government of Cambodia granted 
more than 30 concessions from 1994 to 1997 covering more than half of the forests of Cambodia. 
The forest concession management was introduced on top of the existing collection permit 
system and this made the law unclear for commercial forest management. The purpose of the 
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introduction of the concession system was to hand over power to the private sector to manage the 
forest and also to increase profits for country development. However, the system strongly favored 
the concessionaires rather than the state and it was questionable if it was a commercially 
reasonable initiative. 
 
Furthermore, the concession system was introduced without any consideration to environmental, 
social or cultural impacts. In 1999 the Government started canceling some of the concessions, but 
in many cases the concession areas were logged out and thereby not leaving any forest to 
preserve. According to Cambodia Forest Concession Review from 2000 (cited in McKenny & 
Tola 2002) none of the forest concessions in Cambodia had been managed sustainably. 
 
The process of granting rights to the private sector was criticized for being non-transparent and 
thereby leaving room for corruption and nepotism (de Lopez 2004:38). There are many cases of 
illegal forest exports with the support from senior government and military authorities and the 
income from the illegal activities mainly went into the pockets of the military and political parties 
(Lindayati 2000:30ff).  
 
According to de Lopez (2004) the forest management has failed over the last ten years since the 
interests of powerful political and economic groups gained control over the decision-making 
process, while the local people’s needs have been forgotten. Commercial enterprises inhibit local 
communities; not only from logging but also from NTFP collection and the national authorities 
like the military and army firmly support the commercial sector. This leaves the weakest 
stakeholders, like local villagers who mainly depend on these resources, in a difficult situation. 
Furthermore, conflicts often occur since local communities are banned access to forest resources 
and people often mistrust the government agencies and logging companies. The international 
environmental NGO, Global Witness, who have been accused by the RGC for exaggerating their 
reports on illegal logging, criticizes the commercial system and calls it “deforestation without 
limits” (de Lopez 2004:36).  
 
Community forest development 
The centralised system of forest management did not take local rural people’s needs into 
consideration and the management system, with the commercial concessions in the forestry sector 
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turned out to be destroying the forest. In 2000 a reform in the forest law provided more scope for 
participation from the local users in terms of rights and responsibilities in forest management 
(Henderson 2005).  
 
Community based natural resources management, which community forestry is regarded as, is an 
important component for socio-economic development, from local to national scale. In a 
Cambodian context, community forestry is a type of management system that provides local 
communities a stake in managing forest resources. The Cambodian Community Forestry Task 
Force defines Community forestry in a Cambodian context as “a Community conducting forestry 
activities in compliance with a Community Forestry Agreement. Community Forest is State 
forest, granted to a Community living in or near the forest, subject to an agreement to manage 
and utilize the forest in a sustainable manner between the responsible authority and a 
community” (Braeutigam 2003:9). 
 
Community forestry has been regarded as an alternative to forest concession management as it 
provides opportunity for local people to manage the resources and ensure that they have a voice 
in decision-making. According to Braeutigam (2003) and Beang & Sethaphal (2004) international 
NGOs initiated community based forest management in the beginning of the 1990s, tolerated by 
RGC in order “to support local communities to create awareness, establish structures and 
develop procedures and techniques for a more sustainable management of their forest resources 
and to rehabilitate degraded forestland” (Braeutigam 2003:8). As the success of the initiative 
became visible, especially the provincial governments started supporting and promoting 
community management and with the decentralisation process initiated by the RGC in the mid 
1990s community forestry initiatives has increased (ibid). Community forestry is however, not a 
forest policy in Cambodia, but a draft Community Forestry Sub-decree has been submitted to the 
MAFF and Council Minister at the Department of Forestry and Wildlife (DFW) for approval. The 
draft was done by a working group in consultation with institutions, organizations and 
communities (Beang & Sethaphal 2004). Thus, community forestry is being implemented under 
the existing forest and land policies that principally recognize decentralized forest management 
by communities and private entities, and customary use of the forests (Braeutigam 2003; Beang 
& Sethaphal 2004). However, according to Beang & Sethaphal (2004) the many different policies 
are conflicting and have unclear issues of for instance co-management and taxation.  
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It is the Department of Forestry and Wildlife (DFW) under the Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry 
and Fisheries (MAFF) that has the main responsibility for community forestry on state forestland 
(Braeutigam 2003; Beang & Sethaphal 2004). Areas of the Permanent Forest Reserve can be 
allocated to local communities or groups of people by MAFF, and the cantonment chief of the 
Forest Administration has the authority to approve Community Forest Agreements with 
communities, for periods up to 15 years. Furthermore, the community forest must be managed in 
accordance with a Community Forest Management Plan, which is revised every 5 years 
(Braeutigam 2003:11).   
 
There has been established different networks which are involved in community forestry in 
Cambodia; the Community Forestry Working Group consists of relevant institutions, donors and 
interested organizations and is aiming at promoting participatory processes among stakeholders; 
The National Community Forestry Networking Meeting consists of MAFF, MoE and three 
international NGOs and one national NGO, and is seeking to “share information and experiences 
among community forestry agencies, communities and NGOs“ (Beang & Sethaphal 2004); and 
the Provincial Community Forestry Networking Meeting is aiming at sharing information and 
announcing new legislation between stakeholders like the provincial MAFF, organisations and 
representatives of community forestry committees in the provinces. (Beang & Sethaphal 2004). 
 
On the local level, community based organisations are central in the support, guidance and 
facilitation of the community based forest management process. The community based 
organisations are often integrated into other village organisations and their structure and extent 
vary dependent on the forest resource and village. These community based organisations can for 
instance be forest management committees which can consist of forest user groups in the village 
with responsibilities for managing the forest resources. Inter-village associations also exist in 
order to have an effective body for communicating experiences and demands between the 
different stakeholders at village level (Braeutigam 2003:17).  
 
According to Lindayati, the government adopted the community forestry approach in an urgent 
manner, driven by donors and international agencies and this has resulted in policies remaining 
unclear stated. The focus for community forestry has furthermore been on planting more trees 
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rather than protecting the existing mature ones. There is no significant commitment to forest 
rehabilitation in the long run as the goal of “the existing community forestry activities has been to 
plant trees by providing seedlings to local people and by promoting smallholder tree growing” 
(de Lopez 2004:37). This means that local people have not been granted management rights of 
forest. Thus, towards good governance for community forestry, institutions and policies are 
ultimate factors determining the future of the forests in Cambodia. The reform of institutions and 
policy could provide opportunities for improving forest conditions. This reform involves a 
bottom-up approach where local people have a say in the management of the resources. 
Additionally, in order for the local communities to manage the forest resources sustainable, it is 
necessary that they receive long-term benefits, as incentives for the management, like for instance 
secure user rights to the forest. However, communities have very little influence since the focus 
of the reform has mainly been on national level institutions rather than on the grass root level.  
 
There are no centralised records of the number of community forests in Cambodia but according 
to de Lopez (2004:36) two studies revealed respectively 57 and 237 community forest initiatives 
in Cambodia in 2004. Despite the differences in numbers both studies showed that the 
community forest initiatives covered approximately 70.000 to 80.000 ha; less than one percent of 
total forest cover in Cambodia, and estimates in both studies showed that the community forest 
initiatives covered about 410.000 people (see also Braeutigam 2003:24; Fichtenau et al. 2002:23). 
The majority of the community forests were established in heavily degraded forest areas or bare 
forest area (Braeutigam 2003:24); the communities were only granted the “stewardship over the 
degraded ecosystems in densely populated area” (de Lopez 2004:37). Based on the above figures 
of community forestry area vs. population, the forest area per person to gain benefit from is about 
0.2 ha (ibid). This figure has raised a question whether the community forests allocated to local 
people can support people’s livelihood or not. Furthermore, with the degraded state of the 
community forests, they do not immediately yield timber benefits, and the forests are hence 
mainly used to collect non-timber forest products (NTFPs). However, non-timber forest products 
are also under pressure since the demand is high and the already damaged forests are not able to 
provide enough products.  
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Stakeholder Involvement  
There is a diversity of stakeholders in forest management and they provide a wide range of 
different perspectives, requirements, and goals. Thus, to have effective participation, all 
stakeholders’ participation is important, rather than only participation of government or elite. 
According to Henderson (2005:276) “Both good forest governance and sustainable forest 
management require genuine local participation in forest governance; without this participation 
neither can be achieved”. However, in practice, there is a limitation of relationship between the 
state and non-state agencies. The government has not sufficiently involved civil society in 
decision-making procedures of forest management. Previously, during the introduction of 
Community Forestry, only experts and high ranked agencies took part but now the focus has 
changed towards the local level including representatives of the provincial, district and village 
level, as well as international and national NGOs (de Lopez 2004). 
 
One of the problems in the stakeholder cooperation is the mistrust between communities and 
government authorities after decades of top-down management of resources. This mistrust is 
however going both ways; corruption have been a integral part of the government structures for 
several decades and local people do not trust the authorities; and forest authorities lack trust in 
local people’s ability to manage the resources and have difficulties getting used to being 
facilitators and partners of villagers rather than carrying out authoritarian tasks (Braeutigam 
2003:21). Furthermore, the military still plays an important role in the forest resource use and is 
in some cases acting beyond the law, which can lead to further mistrust in authorities; the law 
enforcement of the central government policies has not been good (Beang & Sethaphal 2004). 
According to the two DFW employees Beang & Sethaphal (2004) the major conflicts in 
community forestry in Cambodia are between communes and concessionaries over especially 
user rights and unsustainable resource use; between communes and military over illegal logging 
and land occupation; and between villages over unclear village territory and overlapping resource 
use. 
 
For the local rural people religion plays an important role and the pagoda is the central social 
institution at the village level that provides support to community forestry activities. The 
traditional Cambodian community is tackling community matters within the unifying function of 
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Ecosystem (i) 
Ecosystem (ii) 
Ecosystem (iii) 
the pagoda. Pagodas have facilitated to bring environmental awareness, supply seedlings, and 
arrange meetings between local people and state agencies.  
 
Gender is another aspect to consider in community forestry management. Gender participation 
has been recognized as an important factor in forest management as male and female have 
different ideas, capability and behavior in relation to forest management. However, so far women 
tend to have less influence on forest resources uses; they are inferior compared to men. 
According to Braeutigam (2003:23) “most of the planning, managing and decision-making is 
carried out by a male dominated leadership.” Thus, to have a balanced participation in relation to 
gender, there is a need to increase and improve the role of women in the committees.  
 
Inland fisheries 
Inland fisheries in Cambodia can be split into three ecosystems; (i) Tonle Sap Lake and River 
zone in western Cambodia; (ii) Mekong and Tonle Bassac River zone in southern Cambodia; and 
(iii) Upper Mekong River zone in northern Cambodia (see map below). The inland fisheries are 
providing approximately 290.000 to 430.000 tons of fish annually, valued $150-$200 million and 
the Tonle Sap Lake and River is estimated to provide 50% to 60% of these. Tonle Sap is the 
largest fresh water lake in Southeast Asia and the most productive in the region (McKenney & 
Tola 2002:49) and this section on inland fisheries will mainly be focussing on Tonle Sap.  
 
Tonle Sap is situated in 
the centre of the central 
plain in Cambodia and 
most people living near 
the lake and river are 
dependent on it as a 
source of livelihood. 
Besides fish, Tonle Sap 
provides the local 
population with other 
aquatic products like 
shrimps, snails, turtles 
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and wetland birds. The Mekong River with which Tonle Sap is connected through the 100 km 
long Tonle Sap Channel determines the hydrology of Tonle Sap. During the rainy season the 
water level in the Mekong increases and this results in water accumulation in the Tonle Sap with 
extensive flooding as a consequence. Each year the surface area of Tonle Sap increases from 
2.500 to about 10.000 km2 with maximum depths varying from 2 meters in the dry season to 14 
meters in the rainy season (Lamberts 2001:22). 
  
It is the Department of Fisheries (DoF) within the Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries 
(MAFF) that has the regulatory authority to manage the fisheries resources of Cambodia. All 
living animals and plants within water bodies are state property according to the fisheries law 
(Hortle et al 2004:26) and DoF is enforcing regulations, granting concessions and issuing 
licenses, collecting fees, and controlling the processing, trade and export activities in Cambodia 
(McKenney & Tola 2002:54). Every year, DoF is rising between $1 and $4 million in official 
revenue and local authorities might collect larger amounts of informal income from the fisheries 
(ibid).  
 
Fisheries in Cambodia are divided into (i) commercial fishing which includes large and middle-
scale fisheries; and (ii) subsistence fishing which includes small-scale fisheries for subsistence. 
Large-scale fishing includes fishing lots for commercial fishing where rights are granted to the 
highest bidder. These fishing lot areas are often the most productive areas among all in the lake. 
The management of fishing lots must comply with what is stated in the ‘burden book’ in addition 
to fishery law where boundaries and season for fishing are specified. Middle-scale fishers are 
granted license from DoF and allowed use of middle-scale fishing gear. They are allowed to fish 
everywhere in the public area but not inside the fishing lot areas. Small-scale fishing allows the 
fishers to use small-scale fishing gear in open access area but not in the fishing lot area. However, 
according to McKenney & Tola (2002:56) most of the open access areas are under some type of 
management arrangement or informal ownership by lot owners or powerful local interests. 
 
The fisheries resources have become under serious pressure due to unsustainable exploitation 
(Thay et al. 2005), but lack of historical records on the size and quality of the resource makes it 
difficult to estimate the decline in the resource. Anecdotal information however suggests that 
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large high-value fish species, which reproduce slowly, has declined while the catch of small, fast-
reproducing and low-value species are as high as ever (McKenney & Tola 2002:50). 
 
The reduction of fishery products has lead to conflicts among users especially between local 
people and the commercial sector. The government has reformed the fishery policy and thereby 
reduced commercial fishing, leaving more opportunities for local fishing. However, the policy 
reform has caused problems since it was implemented in an urgent manner and the responsible 
agencies and stakeholders have had difficulties keeping up with the quick changes (Carson et al. 
2005).  
 
History of fishery management  
In Cambodia, the fisheries management is a complex arrangement of formal and informal 
systems administrating access, rights and practices of fishing. This complex arrangement has its 
roots in the historical management systems of the fishing sector. During the 1859-1897 period of 
the King Norodom reign, fishing areas were sold or was issued as fishing concessions by the 
King to investors and business people who subleased the areas to fishers. The French Protectorate 
in Cambodia continued this management system and in 1908 they formalised and published the 
first fishery law and regulation. The management system existed until the Pol Pot regime took 
over the country in 1975 and limited the fishing activities to include only a few fishing units for 
harvesting and processing of fish. After the fall of the Pol Pot regime a system of collective 
fishing was introduced where solidarity groups managed the fisheries. However, the collective 
system was more or less ignored, and in many places there were open access to fisheries. In the 
late 1980s the fishing concession system, similar to the one existing before the rise of the Pol Pot, 
was reintroduced in order for the government to raise revenue. This system still exists. 
(McKenney & Tola 2002). 
 
From 1998, a bidding system of fishing concessions was implemented where bidders could lease 
fishing lots and then sub-lease these to fishers. The “owners” of the lots could take commission 
from the sub-leasers for instance by requiring a fee for fishing or a share of the catch. This system 
caused conflicts between the lot owners and fishermen especially since the areas available for 
public fishing by local small-scale fishers was too small. Hence, in 2000 after a visit in Siem 
Reap the Prime Minister, Hun Sen, ordered a reform of the fishing management system aiming at 
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reducing the fishing lots areas to half the surface area as prior to the reform. Consequently, and in 
response to conflicts between lot owners and small scale fishermen, community fisheries were 
introduced.  
 
Community fisheries development  
Due to the constant conflicts in the fishery management field among the local fishermen and the 
commercial fishermen, a reform of the fishery policy was required. The reform was expected to 
address some long-standing management problems such as insecure access and rights to open 
access areas for small-scale fishers, destructive and illegal fishing practices and the rival claims 
over fisheries, floodplains and water resources. The reform reduced the number and size of 
fishing lots and thereby made it possible to establish areas for community fishery and small-scale 
fishing.  
 
Community fisheries are one of the examples of community based natural resource management. 
According to McKenney and Tola (2002:58) community fisheries in Cambodia are broadly 
defined as “a voluntary partnership among stakeholders of a fisheries resource, with the common 
objective to manage the resource sustainably for the benefit of all stakeholders”. Thay et al. 
(2005) describes community fisheries as circumstances where local people are given authority to 
manage, control, manipulate and conserve the fisheries resources in sustainable ways and 
cooperatively. Commitment is the core factor for a successful management of community 
fisheries and commitment is required from all stakeholders, particularly the local people with 
support from government, in order to work cooperatively towards sustainability.  
 
In 2002 Cambodia Development Research Institute identified 162 community fisheries in 
Cambodia, which involves 351 villages or about 303.000 people (McKenney & Tola 2002:58ff). 
The first community fishery in Cambodia was created in 1994 by the Department of Fisheries 
(DoF) with cooperation of Asian Institute of Technology (AIT). The primary objective of this 
initiative was to create a ‘community-managed fishpond’ in order for farmers to conserve the fish 
resources during the dry season. Following that year, more community fisheries were created in 
other provinces with the support from United Nations Food and Agricultural Organisation, FAO 
(Thay et al 2005:120). Before the fishery policy reform in 2000, community fisheries were 
created as a mechanism to manage natural resources. Currently, the establishment of community 
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fisheries is for the purpose of minimizing conflicts through fisheries resource management by 
making it possible for local people to gain equal access to the resources and to utilize the resource 
sustainably.  
 
In 2001 a separate Community Fisheries Development Office was established within Department 
of Fisheries with the aim to support communities and encourage them to undertake participatory 
management (Kurien et al 2006:5). A Sub-decree on Community Fisheries Management has been 
passed in May 2005 but community fisheries are not yet part of the fisheries law and have 
therefore no legal sanction. However a new fisheries law that will provide the legislative 
framework for community fisheries management is presently under discussion in the National 
Assembly. The Sub-decree on Community Fisheries Management spell out five objectives of 
community fisheries: “(a) to manage inland fisheries and related ecosystem where fishing lots 
have been cancelled (b) manage fisheries resources in sustainable and equitable manner (c) to 
increase understanding and recognition of benefits of fisheries resource through participation in 
protection and management (d) provide legal framework to establish community fisheries (e) 
improve standard of living and reduce poverty” (Kurien et al 2006:7). 
 
The community fisheries are managed by a Community Fishery Committee (CFC), which 
consists of members of the community fishery that are elected by all the members of the 
community fishery. The Community Fishery Committee will, for a period of 5 years be in charge 
of the leading and management of the community fishery in accordance with the sub-decree 
(Kurien et al 2006:7ff). The fishery resources are still state property but communities, both 
members and non-members of the community fishery, have access and usufruct rights to small-
scale fishing (ibid). A management plan in accordance with the existing fishery law, which 
addresses issues like sustainable use, fishing gear and timing, enforcement and dispute resolution 
has to be developed by the involved stakeholders in the community fisheries, such as local people 
(the CFC), government authorities and commercial fishermen. There are not many networks in 
which the CFCs can organise themselves in order to coordinate their work and activities. 
According to Kurien et al (2006) a possibility for organising the CFCs could be through greater 
cooperation and involvement from CFC members in Commune Councils. If there are more than 
one community fishery in a commune the Commune Councils could provide greater coordination 
between the CFCs: however, this is presently not the case.  
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When community fisheries were introduced the concept was confused by local people and 
stakeholders in the government and NGOs with the fishing solidarity groups practiced during the 
1980s, which failed due to lack of commitment and weak leadership. The misunderstanding of 
the concept made people prejudge and distrust the outcome of the implementation as deemed to 
fail. Therefore it has been recognized that it is time consuming to make people understand this 
new concept of management. (Thay et al 2005:119ff). 
 
Some of the main problems with the transfer of power from government authorities to local 
communities are the lack of trust people have in each other. According to McKenney & Tola 
(2002:58), concern from DoF staff that local people for instance will overuse the resource or that 
local authorities will expropriate fishing rights and sell them are some of the constraints for 
implementing effective community management and for transfer of power. However, these 
concerns exists since there have been several incidents with corruption in the fishing sector from 
military, lot owners or local authorities (ibid).    
 
Stakeholder involvement 
The development of community fisheries in Cambodia has been ensured with economic and 
technical support from NGOs, especially international ones. The lack of experience and capacity 
in organising and structuring this new management system has made the support from external 
facilitators vital. Many NGOs have been a major source of assistance in the rebuilding of the 
country after the civil war and has thereby gained legitimacy and cooperation from the 
population. This has made it easier for NGOs to implement new management strategies for 
natural resources.  
  
In community fisheries the lack of trust between local authorities on one side and NGOs and local 
people on the other side is a problem. Local authorities in some provinces have not cooperated 
with NGOs, as they fear losing benefits and political power. Although some local authorities 
cooperate with NGOs, others still worry that the communities will become strong and they claim 
that this will make the control with illegal fishing difficult. In Battambang province, one 
commune chief did not pay much attention to community fishery arrangements and even stated 
that community fisheries should not have rights to protect the resources as the communities lack 
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skills and experience in doing this (Thay et al. 2005). Furthermore, the military is also very active 
in management of the fishing resources in Cambodia. According to van Acker (2003a:12ff) case 
studies from some provinces show that the military work together with fishing lot owners and 
have for instance, in exchange for rights to certain areas of the fishing lot, cordoned off the 
fishing lot area the whole year, even though local people are allowed to fish during the open 
season. Thay et al (2005) states that especially low salaries in the military makes military 
employees support illegal fishing practices in order to gain more income.   
 
The fishing lot owners are major stakeholders in the management of fishing resources in 
Cambodia. Apart from cooperating with the military in some provinces, some fishing lot owners 
are also subletting fishing lot areas to local people and can thereby determine access but also the 
price for access to fishing areas. The lot owners are able to make a living from the subletting even 
though it is an illegal practice to sublet. However, due to weak enforcement of the regulations, 
this practice continues. Furthermore, according to Münther (2005:7) some members of CFCs are 
cooperating with fishing lot owners and are making informal agreements, which are not for the 
benefit of the members of the community fishery. These actions against the interest of the general 
public increase the distrust among community members and between community members and 
CFC members (ibid). Additionally, beneficiaries of the former fishing lot system, such as fishing 
lot owners and full time fishermen, are likely to be in opposition to the newly established 
community fisheries, since these are the main reason for the cut-down in fishing lot areas and 
hence the decrease in their income (ibid).      
   
Religion plays a major role for many people in Cambodia. Superstition in relation to nature is 
very common especially in rural areas; for instance some fishermen do not kill the big fish since 
they believe it will bring bad luck (Thay et al 2005). The pagoda or wat has, as mentioned before, 
been an important unifying entity in many communities, and continue to be (Kurien 2006:15). 
This is especially due to the fact that the pagoda committees and the pagoda itself is the only 
enduring community structure in the rural areas of Cambodia. The pagoda is often centring 
organisation of traditional self-help activities (Pellini 2004:6) and traditionally, rural people 
gathered together in groups, through the pagoda, to protect and conserve natural resources in their 
local area as a sort of community management.  
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Women have traditionally played a big role in fishing activities by processing and selling fish, 
and supporting the husband in fishing activities. The limited access to fishing areas changed the 
division of labour in poor households, since the late rice harvest also coincides with the fishing 
season. This made the workload of women bigger since women were in charge of the households 
and at the same time had to help their husbands in fishing activities. However, the community 
fisheries can be a means to assure better access to productive fishing areas. Furthermore, the role 
of women in fishery management might expand since they are able to get involved in community 
fishery committees (CFC). According to Kurien et al. (2006:17) even though the CFCs are male 
dominated some women have significant roles in the community fishery committees as 
secretaries or accountants.  
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Chapter 6: Findings & discussion  
 
This chapter will contain a discussion about the findings from the cases in relation to the 
implementation of community based natural resource management in Cambodia. As stated in the 
methodology (chapter two) the choice of theory is affecting the conclusion of the project; 
however in order to avoid the conclusion being determined by the theory only, the social, 
economic and political context of Cambodia will also be discussed in order to understand how 
these elements have an impact on the implementation of CBNRM in Cambodia. 
 
The main issue throughout this project has been participation by the local population in the 
management of natural resources since community based natural resource management is based 
on a principle of participation. However, the questions are who are participating in the natural 
resource management and how are they participating. According to Oakley (1995:8) participation 
is defined as a process where people are actively involved in the political structures; that is, 
decision-making and implementation procedures of development activities, but it also means that 
people should be able to confront and deal with problems and issues that affect their livelihoods. 
The inclusion of participation in development initiatives thus means that it should be a process of 
widening the access to development initiatives and make sure that benefits from these initiatives 
reach the previously excluded groups of people. Hence participation is a political process where 
the political system should open up for resource weak people, and let them have a say in the 
issues that affect their lives.  
 
According to Mayers and Bass (1998:289) major benefits, such as better relations between 
stakeholders because of increased transparency, accountability and political credibility, can be 
obtained if wider participation is used in decision-making for policy formulation and 
implementation. Mayers and Bass are hence suggesting that participation is necessary in policy 
formation and implementation; equal to what Christensen & Jensen (2001) and Hyland (1995) are 
suggesting. In Cambodia, the development of community forestry and community fishery has 
been undertaken with participation from the local population. However, the participation has only 
been to a certain extent. 
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Agenda-setting 
If we look at the different stages of the decision-making process, participation has been included 
at some levels. In the terminology of Hyland (1995), about the process of decision-making, the 
agenda-setting is the first process where participation is necessary. According to the very limited 
literature about the initiation of community based management strategies in Cambodia, most of 
the community forestry initiatives have been established by international agencies (de Lopez 
2004:37; Beang & Sethaphal 2004), whereas the Cambodian Government has established 
community fisheries with help from especially FAO. There have been problems with commercial 
exploitation of natural resources and local people’s access to the resources, and the answer from 
the international agencies to these problems has been community based management. In forestry 
for instance, especially the international focus on deforestation has made international agencies 
commence implementation of community management initiatives.  
 
Traditionally people have not been gathering in associations or groups in Cambodia; the only 
organised faction in the community is the pagoda. It is also mainly the pagodas that have 
organised community management schemes in order to protect the resources. Hence, the pagodas 
are the main viable initiator for setting agendas for community management, since it is not a 
tradition in Cambodia for people to organise themselves within the community. 
 
However, along with the decentralisation process, village level organisations are continually 
being established and the process for local communities to start community based natural 
resource management strategies could thereby be easier. Yet, many difficulties lie within the fact 
that the Cambodian organisational structure is based upon a patron-client relationship; that is a 
hierarchical structure that does not give much room for poor people to be heard in the agenda-
setting or decision-making since they do not have political equality. This is institutionalised in 
society and is automatically distributing burdens and advantages to people. Additionally, if poor 
people get access to the decision-making process there might be requirements for their 
knowledge or abilities to articulate and this can in itself be hindering them from participating 
actively in setting the agenda and suggesting alternatives. Hence, traditional power relations and 
the institutional settings for poor people to actively participate in decisions are important aspects 
to consider when participation is to be obtained in management strategies in Cambodia.  
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According to de Lopez (2004) one of the reasons why local people are not forming community 
forestry groups themselves is because it is not economically viable; the costs outweigh the 
benefits. It would be necessary to seek funding for a community forestry project and in 
combination with a requirement to create a management strategy for the forest, this can be very 
time consuming and complicated for rural people. Furthermore, if the forest resource from a local 
perspective seems abundant, the organisation of community forestry seems unimportant, at least 
if there is open access to the resource. In relation to community fisheries, the initiators were 
mainly the Cambodian government and not local people. Small-scale fisheries are based at 
household or family level (Degen & Thuok 1998:4), which makes the initiation of new forms of 
fishery organisation difficult.  
 
 
Decision-making 
On the decision-making arena (see chapter three) a comparative analysis and actual decision-
making is taking place. In order to solve a problem, it is necessary that the stakeholders are 
involved in the decision-making process since they can help find the root of the environmental 
problem. Since institutional or policy failures can be underlying problems that affect the 
environment in a negative way, these have to be exposed in order to solve the problems. 
 
As stated in chapter four it is necessary to link policy development efforts with the realities on the 
ground in order to create acceptable outcomes for the interest groups and therefore participation 
of interest groups is important in the decision-making process. In the Cambodian case the rural 
population has in many cases been consulted in the decision-making process (van Acker 2003b; 
Kurien et al 2006; Thay et al 2005; Levinson 2002). However, the extent to which the local rural 
population has been consulted and to which extent the obtained knowledge from the local 
population has been used in the decision-making process has not been thoroughly treated in the 
literature. In relation to the sub-decrees on forestry and fishery (see chapter five), van Acker 
(2003a:27) states that the reviews of the sub-decrees, after the consultation processes with the 
interest groups, were believed to undermine the stakeholder contributions. As a consequence, the 
first draft Sub-decree on community fisheries from Department of Fisheries (DoF) and Ministry 
of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries (MAFF) was rejected by the Council of Ministers, because 
it contained too much government control over the community fisheries (Levinson 2002). The 
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DoF and MAFF were responsible for making the draft sub-decree, and this was done without open 
discussion and debate about the content of the draft. Consequently the comparative analysis 
ended up with the responsible ministry and department being hesitant to transfer power to the 
local rural population. Additionally, the actual forest area under community control is only 0.7% 
of the forest area in Cambodia (Carson et al. 2005), which is an indication of the government 
being hesitant to allocate power to local management and thereby control the resources 
themselves. 
    
If we look at the actual decision about implementing community forestry and community fishery 
in certain communities, the involvement of the local population might have been small. 
Especially the international organisations (IO) do not necessarily go to a local community and ask 
what they want the IO to implement in their community. The content of the project is, in many 
cases pre-determined since it is both time consuming and expensive to examine what the local 
population need. Hence, the local communities get the chance to accept or deny the offer for a 
project, since support for a project is necessary if it has to succeed. In the case of choosing 
between a project and no project in a community, there might be a tendency for the communities 
to accept a project being implemented since the alternative is nothing; here direct power is hence 
being used. The local population does not have the political equality to participate in the actual 
decision-making but only in the implementation. According to Evans (2002:99ff) in the 
implementation of community fisheries facilitated by FAO, a facilitation team, trained by FAO, 
was discussing the concept of community fisheries with local authorities after it had been decided 
to implement community fisheries in Cambodia. However, the formulation of rules and 
regulations of the community fishery was taking place at village level and then discussed and 
negotiated in a central committee elected by village representatives and local authorities (ibid). 
However, it does not necessarily mean that the external facilitators or powerful people in the local 
community do not have power over the local people to lead the formulation of the regulations in a 
certain direction. Corruption is very common in Cambodia and it is possible to buy loyalty or 
votes in a many situations; or to be exact, exercising direct power. This way they can affect the 
decision-making process so the outcomes are pre-determined and fits their needs.  
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Implementation  
If we turn to the implementation process, it is an important part of the decision-making process 
since this is where people can negotiate about what CBNRM is in the specific context. It is 
possible in the implementation process to affect the process in a certain direction, since the 
outlined framework for CBNRM has to be fitted into the specific context. Since communities are 
made up by a multiple of interests the implementation process needs to make it possible to fit 
these different interests into the framework or at least find consensus between the different 
interests. However, persons or groups of people can use their power to achieve their own goals 
and therefore the implementation of CBNRM should create opportunities for resource-weak 
persons to be heard in the implementation process.  
 
If we use the terminology of Winter (1990) and look at the organisational and inter-organisational 
implementation in relation to the cases, the different levels of government in Cambodia has 
played a big role in the implementation of CBNRM. The transfer of power is a very important 
aspect if participation from the local population has to be obtained. In the case of community 
forestry in Cambodia, many communities have gained access and user rights over degraded forest 
areas and not natural rich areas; according to de Lopez (2004:36) two thirds of all community 
forests are located in heavily degraded forest areas or areas with no forest at all (see also 
Braeutigam 2003). In fisheries, the same is the fact; most of the fishing areas under community 
management are less productive than areas still under the management of fishing lots (Sithirith 
2004:12). The transfer of powers to the local population for resource management has been 
limited to areas where there are limited resources to manage and the local population will not 
benefit from these areas immediately. Hence, the government departments are using indirect 
power by interpreting and implementing CBNRM so they are able to keep their power over the 
natural rich resources. 
  
Additionally, the transfer of power has not been supported by a legal framework, and this creates 
insecurity for the local population since they are not sure if their rights to the resources will be 
lost again. According to van Acker (2003b) the fisheries reform was a result of the announcement 
of the prime minister to abolish a number of fishing lots and commence community fisheries 
initiatives. “When powers are transferred through discretionary executive-branch decision, local 
users may exploit these new rights with urgency if they believe the transfer of rights is not 
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secure” (van Acker 2003b:13). Hence people are not willing to invest in the reform if they are not 
confident in the long-term benefits.  
 
In relation to forestry, de Lopez (2004:39) states that in some locations villagers are worried that 
the forestry department will cut down trees for sale once they have reached maturity and thereby 
deny local people the benefits from their work of protecting them. According to de Lopez 
(2004:39) “…at any point in time, with a six-month notice, community forestry agreements are 
subject to unilateral termination by the state if ‘there is another purpose which provides a higher 
social and public benefit to the Kingdom of Cambodia’”. This right of the government destroys 
the incentives for the local people to participate in the initiative. In order for people to put an 
effort into the forest management, it is necessary to have secure user rights since forest areas take 
years to regenerate and people would like to be able to harvest the benefits. Hence transfer of 
power to the local population along with proper legal framework might create better 
implementation since a legal framework can enable community organisations to get a more clear 
reference point when establishing CBNRM organisations. But this is not necessarily enough. It is 
also necessary that all sections of society respect the new rights of the communities and trust that 
the locals are able to manage the resources in sustainable ways. This can however bring along 
social tensions since control over resources also means that the income and wealth distribution 
changes in communities and old alliances are ruptured (Kurien et al. 2006:9).  
 
The street-level bureaucrats are also playing a vital role in the implementation of CBNRM in 
Cambodia. Again trust and transfer of power are important issues since the street-level 
bureaucrats are those who translate regulations into action; they are hence the persons that can 
give the local population a big participating role in the implementation by transferring power to 
the locals. There are several incidents from the cases in Cambodia where the street-level 
bureaucrats are not transferring power to the local population but instead using the resources for 
their own benefit, for instance through the selling of user rights (see Sithirith 2004; Thay et al. 
2005; van Acker 2003a; Beang & Sethaphal 2004). The reasons for this can be distrust in the 
ability of the locals to manage the resources (McKenney & Tola 2002), or it can be due to low 
wages of government employees who use the resources to earn an additional income. Hence 
participation by the local population in the implementation process can be difficult to obtain if 
there is corruption, and distrust between bureaucrats and the local population.   
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Policies are often changing status quo and the response to these changes by the target group is 
necessary to understand in order to succeed in the implementation. The behaviour of the target 
group and the socioeconomic conditions surrounding them affect the way they respond to 
changes in status quo. In Cambodia the political history, which has been characterised by 
changing regimes, civil war, corruption and distrust, affects the way people respond to changes in 
status quo. Historically, when there has been a change in status quo, it has often been changes, 
which have had a negative effect on the local population, and this fact can affect the way people 
respond to new types of organisation like in the case of management of resources. It is necessary 
that the population is familiar with the changes and know how and why they are implemented. In 
Cambodia there was confusion about the concept of community fisheries, which was compared to 
the failed fishing solidarity groups during the 1980s (Thay et al 2005) and this kind of confusion 
makes people respond negatively to the policies. Hence adequate information to the target group 
about the policy and the aim of the policy is necessary if the target group has to respond 
positively to it.  
  
Participation has been limited in the case of community forestry and community fisheries in 
Cambodia. Community fishery is an older concept and seems more integrated in the society than 
community forestry and it hence seems like there is more participation from the local population 
in community fishery than in community forestry. There can be many reasons for this, but one 
reason could be the economic benefit from involvement in this kind of management. Community 
fisheries are giving people an immediate benefit in the access to fishing areas and thereby food at 
the table. In forestry the benefits cannot be obtained immediately especially since many 
community forests are located in degraded forest areas. It is however notable that in the long run 
the participation in the management of the resources might change. Here the size and mobility of 
the resources play a role since it is necessary to have some sort of centralized control of the fish 
resources, because they move around. It is difficult to let the local population control the 
resources on their own so the solution can be management as a joint activity between locals and a 
more centralized authority. The co-management has to have clear rules and regulation in order for 
this cooperation to obtain its goals; otherwise this can affect the participation and decision-
making in a negative way. Additionally, it is necessary that the laws be enforced; for instance in 
Community based natural resource management in Cambodia 
 75 
the fisheries sector migratory fish, which are preserved in one area, might be caught in another 
area if the law is not enforced. 
 
Community based natural resource management is not the only option to resource management. 
Commercial fisheries provide the state with tax-revenue and can also be a potential co-manager 
for the resources since sustainable harvest of fish is also in the interest of commercial fishermen. 
The commercial fishermen, at least the local ones, have an incentive to preserve the fish stock 
because they live from it and it is their source of income. The fishing lot system also provides job 
opportunities for local people and the fishing lot owners have the economic abilities to invest in 
fishing gear, boats, processing and transport of the fish (Hortle 2004:28). Hence, if the 
commercial fishermen are still a part of the management system in Cambodia, it is also necessary 
to take these stakeholders into consideration in the decision-making process and management of 
the resources.  
 
 
The community committees and networks 
The community committees dealing with community forestry and community fisheries are 
supposed to deal with the management of the resources. However, in relation to decisions, the 
question is how much it is possible for them to decide. The responsibilities of the committees are 
mainly those of conserving the resources, which means that they have to make sure that people 
do not use the resources they are not allowed to use. However, the committees do not have the 
mandate to be enforcers of the regulations, so they are mainly making decisions inside the 
framework of the management plan and this does not leave them with many grand decisions 
concerning the natural resources. 
 
In the community management committees, the resource users are supposed to be represented. 
However, according to Im (2000:15) there are two different kinds of management committees in 
community forestry; (i) one where the village chief make up the committee members itself or 
have a high position like chairperson and (ii) one where the villagers make up committee 
members and occupy positions like chairperson. In the last type of committee the village chief 
can be member of the committee but does not hold a high position. The first type of committee 
gives the village leader a lot of power and the users less power to influence on the decisions 
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regarding community forestry. The second type of committee, where the villagers make up the 
committee could be more participatory if these persons are democratically elected between the 
users. However, in a hierarchical society like the Cambodian with patron-client relationships, 
decisions are often made by the more powerful. The power structure will be reproduced if the less 
powerful people accept that there are more powerful people who make decisions. This can be a 
problem in relation to CBNRM since it is the users that should be the primary decision-makers in 
regard to the natural resource use. If it is the village leader or powerful people only, that are 
making decisions, even though they are also users of the resource, the concept of participation is 
undermined. However, in practice, the implementation of CBNRM can be difficult if the aim is 
for the resource weak people to participate in the decision-making process. It can be difficult for 
people to participate if they do not have the resources and capacity to overcome the extra time or 
work it might be demanding.  
 
Additionally, according to van Acker (2003b:37) community based organisations have emerged 
as a result of outside intervention from for instance NGOs. As stated previously, traditionally 
people have not gathered in groups or organisations in Cambodia. The lack of social capital in the 
country, specifically the trust among people in a society, which makes them able to act 
collectively, has been an impediment for people to organise themselves. Solidarity between 
people has not been strong and the society has been characterised by individualism and close 
personal links with families and not the community (Pellini 2004:5) and this affects the 
organising of the community based management. Furthermore, NGOs have tended to dominate 
institutions at village levels and the community ownership of village organisations has been 
limited. Even though NGOs’ methods are participatory, they have applied a more top-down 
facilitation than bottom-up planning. This can make it difficult for the village organisations to be 
effective and furthermore, the community type of organisation is new for them and hence takes 
time to get used to. 
  
If we look at the networks established in Cambodia in relation to CBNRM (see chapter five), it is 
mainly the international NGOs and the relevant ministries that are represented in these networks. 
There is a lack of link between local level and national level; to be precise, where the decisions 
are made and where they are implemented. It seems as if the NGOs are representing the local 
level, since they are the ones operating at the local level. NGOs are however not representative of 
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the local people; they have not been elected democratically by the population. Local authorities 
are often locally elected and their solutions should therefore picture the needs in the local area, 
whereas the NGOs not necessarily have the legitimacy. It would hence be more democratic to 
create a link between local level authorities and national level authorities. It is however necessary 
to keep in mind the widespread corruption in the country, which also exists at local level and 
hence can cause difference between local people’s real needs and the articulated needs by the 
local authorities. 
 
In the Provincial Community Forestry Network Meeting representatives from the community 
forestry committees at provincial level are represented along with organisations and provincial 
MAFF. However, the link between the provincial level and the national level is missing. 
Additionally, the organisation of the community forestry committees on provincial level have to 
have a good connection to the local level committees if the work, needs and desires at local level 
has to be taken into consideration at a provincial level.  
 
 
Access to information 
In government decisions concerning natural resources the relevant stakeholders have to know the 
possible outcomes of the decision and alternatives to the decision, especially since it can affect 
the livelihoods of the stakeholders. Hyland (1995) emphasises in his discussion about decision-
making processes that equal access for all stakeholders to relevant information in relation to a 
decision is necessary in order to obtain a democratic decision-making process.  
 
Cambodia is a rural country, affected by many years of civil war and this has caused the 
educational level of the Cambodians to be very low. The literacy rate in Cambodia is 73.6% but a 
great deal of old people in the countryside are not able to read, since they grew up with limited 
access to education. This means that information about political matters has to be distributed to 
especially rural areas in alternative manners than in documents and this is not necessarily the case 
in Cambodia. Kurien et al (2006:6) emphasises, in relation to the diffusion of knowledge about 
the community fisheries Sub-decree, that the use of visual and audio communication in simple 
versions, which is highlighting the key elements of the decisions, is vital when distributing 
information to the population. This should be both in matters concerning future decision-making 
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but also decisions to be implemented, since technical matters such as rights, duties and roles for 
members of community based organisations has to be understood and acknowledged. In the 
future, the educational system will have a major impact on decision-making processes in 
Cambodia. The existence of an egalitarian educational system is a necessary concern if people 
should have equal opportunities to obtain information and thereby have more equal access to 
decision-making processes.  
 
Moreover, it is vital that the information systems are not monopolised by sub-groups in the 
decision-making system. Commercial interests are an example of a sub-group that can control 
access to specific knowledge on for instance effects of natural resource use on the environment. 
When relevant information is kept in the possession of one sub-group, they exercise indirect 
power. If certain sub-groups determine the access to information about alternatives to or goals of 
a decision-making it hinders an equal and thereby democratic decision-making process. One of 
the main channels in which rural people obtain information is through the media, such as TV and 
radio. However, dependent on the ownership, regulations etc. in relation to the different media, 
there is not necessarily requirements, that the media has to spread specific information about 
decisions to be made concerning for instance natural resource use in rural areas. It is hence up to 
the involved stakeholders, and especially government authorities to make sure that relevant 
information reaches all stakeholders. 
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Chapter 6: Conclusion 
 
This project has examined community based natural resource management in Cambodia with 
particular reference to community forestry and community fishery. Even though community 
forestry and community fishery are two different types of CBNRM and there are other types of 
CBNRM, it is possible to draw some general conclusions about the implementation of CBNRM in 
Cambodia. Each of the cases of community management is unique since the resources are to be 
managed differently due to their differences in size, mobility and management methods. 
Furthermore, community based natural resource management is a fairly new concept in 
Cambodia and has not been institutionalised in the organisational structures of the country. 
Hence, the implementation of CBNRM is still on a project stage and only implemented certain 
places. This also makes the implementation different from place to place since there is no specific 
framework for how to implement the strategy. However, CBNRM is a strategy that involves 
people’s participation and in a country where participation is not part of the traditional 
organisational structure of society, it is possible to draw some general conclusions about the 
implementation of the participatory strategy in Cambodia. 
 
 
Participation & power in CBNRM 
Participation from the local population in the implementation of CBNRM has been limited. The 
literature study suggests that international organisations and the Royal Cambodian Government 
have set the agenda for community participation in natural resource management and decided, 
between alternatives, what kind of natural resource management to implement. The local 
population has hence not initiated the implementation and has only had the opportunity to accept 
or reject the implementation, with the possible alternative of getting nothing in the case of 
rejecting the implementation. The local population has however taken part in the implementation; 
they have, in an example from community fishery, had the opportunity to take part in the 
formulation of rules and regulations. However, these should be formulated within a framework 
already made at a national level and it is likely that the local population has been exposed to top-
down facilitation from NGOs, international organisations or government authorities in the 
formulation; thus their influence on the regulations might be limited. In the terminology of 
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Hyland (1995) this kind of decision-making is far from being democratic, especially because of 
the limited participation. However, as stated previously, Hyland’s definition of democratic 
decision-making is idealistic and furthermore, the social, cultural, economic and political 
situation in Cambodia plays a large role in the discussion about participation.    
 
One of the main constraints in CBNRM in Cambodia is the traditional organisational structures in 
the country. First of all the only unifying structure in the community is the pagoda that have set 
the agenda for resource management in the light of Buddhist religion. There is no tradition for 
people to organise themselves within the community in order to act collectively and due to 
historical reasons there is a lack of solidarity between people in the community. This is a major 
constraint for implementing community based management, since it is not common for 
community members to cooperate within the community. Secondly, the patron-client relationship 
makes it difficult to implement a new type of organisation, especially when power structures are 
reproduced in the decision-making processes. For instance, if powerful people in the community 
make up the resource user committees in the community; if they are elected because of their 
powerful position, there is a chance that the less powerful people might not have a say or the 
powerful people profits from the seat in the committee. This undermines the goal of empowering 
poor people and let them gain access to the decision-making process. Thirdly, the lack of mutual 
trust between government authorities and communities is further hindering an effective 
implementation of CBNRM. Government authorities have hesitated to transfer power to local 
communities. There is a lack of trust in local people’s abilities to manage the resources and this is 
illustrated in forestry by the fact that only 0.7% of Cambodian forests are under community 
management and most of the forest is degraded forest area. Furthermore, the lack of legal 
framework in relation to people’s long-term access and user rights to the resources generates 
insecurity and with no confidence in guarantees from the government, there are no incentives for 
people to manage the resources sustainably. Additionally, the widespread corruption at all levels 
of society makes the trust between people even more difficult to obtain. Consequently, at the 
moment it seems as if there is a need for authorities to control the access to and use of natural 
resources, at least to a certain extent, in order to keep the use of the resources at a sustainable 
level.  
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CBNRM is not implemented as a participatory strategy at the moment in Cambodia but rather as 
top-down facilitation. Hence, perhaps CBNRM is not the solution to the degradation of natural 
resources, yet. CBNRM is a very different way of organising the society and the traditional power 
and organisational structures in the country needs to be overcome in order to be able to have 
effective implementation of CBNRM as a participatory strategy. Therefore the building of a civil 
society might make it easier to implement CBNRM. Through the establishment of interest groups 
or civil society organisations that pleads the cause of the poor, poor people can slowly gain a 
voice in the decision-making processes. This can give life to new perceptions of how society has 
to be structured and who should participate in the decision-making processes.  
 
However, does this mean that CBNRM should be abandoned and the natural resource 
management should continue as it does now, until civil society has gained influence on the 
decision-making arena? There are cases of success in the implementation of CBNRM in 
Cambodia and perhaps it is possible to continue the implementation while civil society 
organisations are gaining access to decision-making processes. It is however necessary to 
acknowledge the constraints for obtaining participation from target groups such as poor people 
and understand that the framework for implementing CBNRM has to be fitted into the context, so 
the poor people will be heard in the decision-making.  
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